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I. INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus has long been understood to provide an
"effective and speedy instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had
into the legality of the detention of a person."' Yet in February 2008,
six years will have passed since the first petition for habeas corpus was
filed on behalf of accused enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.2 In that time, no hearings have been held on the merits of any of
the petitions filed by the detainees challenging the legality of their
detentions. No discovery has proceeded. No depositions have been
taken. And no court has examined the evidence offered to support the
detentions or ruled on whether any of the detainees are legally held.3
With the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),
which purports to withdraw federal jurisdiction over the Guantanamo
detainees' habeas petitions, the prospect that any of the detainees will
get their day in court seems more remote than ever.4
1. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). Habeas has provided a
quick remedy for unlawful detention at least since the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31
Car. 2, c. 2 (1679) (Eng.), which Parliament enacted to provide "more speedy relief of
all persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed criminal matters" and which
required that a jailer provide a return on the writ within three days.
2. See Docket, Rasul v. Bush, Civil Action No. 1:02cv00299 (D.D.C.)
(opened Feb. 19, 2002).
3. In January 2005, Judge Leon ruled that the Guantanamo detainees lack
cognizable rights and therefore the detainees' habeas petitions should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005), aff'd
sub nom., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007). Although Leon effectively upheld the legality of the detentions,
neither he nor any court has reviewed the particular evidence or allegations put forward
to justify the detention of any individual detainees.
4. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 950j, 120
Stat. 2600, 2623-24 (2006).
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Rather than reviewing the sufficiency of any allegations or
evidence that the government might offer to justify the indefinite
detentions, the courts have spent six years trying to answer a single
question: whether the detainees possess any legally cognizable rights.5
Even that issue remains unresolved. Although a person might have
expected that the detainees would be the parties drawing attention to
their rights, it has been the government, at every turn, that has made
the detainees' rights the central issue in the Guantanamo cases. From
the beginning, the government has argued that the detainees have no
legally enforceable rights because they are foreigners held outside U.S.
territory, and the government has repeated this argument in various
forms throughout the litigation. Initially, the government framed the
no-rights argument in terms of jurisdiction: the courts lack jurisdiction
because the detainees have no right to go to court.6 After the Supreme
Court rejected that argument, the government argued that the detainees
have no right to counsel because they are foreigners held outside U.S.
territory.7  After the district court rejected that argument, the
government moved to dismiss the habeas petitions on the merits
because, as foreigners held outside U.S. territory, the detainees have no
rights.8 In the latest phase of the litigation, the government has again
invoked its argument that the detainees have no rights, asserting that the
withdrawal of federal jurisdiction under the MCA does not violate the
Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution because the detainees are
aliens held outside U.S. territory and therefore have no rights under the
Suspension Clause or any other source of U.S. law. 9 In June 2007, the
5. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that
the federal courts have no jurisdiction to review the petitioners' habeas claims because
the petitioners have no cognizable rights), afftd, Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 468 (2004) (holding that
the detainees have the statutory right to pursue habeas), upon remand, In re
Guantanamo Detaitlee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying
motion to dismiss on the ground that the detainees have enforceable rights under the
Fifth Amendment), rev'd, Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 991 (holding that the petitioners
lack constitutional rights, including rights under the Suspension Clause), cert. granted,
Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 3078. This litigation history, and the central role played by
the question of the existence of the detainees' rights, is discussed in Part I.A.
6. See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1139-40, rev'd, Rasul, 542 U.S. at 467-68.
7. See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2004).
8. As discussed below, two district courts reached contrary positions on
whether the detainees possess enforceable rights. Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee
Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (holding that the detainees possess rights to due process
under the Fifth Amendment), with Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (holding that the
detainees have no rights under U.S. law). See also infra notes 41-60 and accompanying
text.
9. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 19-25, Boumediene v. Bush,
Nos. 06-1195 and 06-1196 (U.S. filed Mar. 21, 2007).
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of the
Suspension Clause to the MCA, and the Court now appears poised, at
long last, to determine whether the detainees possess enforceable
rights. 0
With so much judicial attention devoted to the question of whether
the detainees have any legal rights, a great deal of scholarship has
addressed which categories of accused enemy combatants, if any,
possess rights enforceable through habeas. 1' Scholars have come to
differing conclusions about whether aliens held outside U.S. territory
possess cognizable rights. 2 Professors Richard H. Fallon, Jr., and
Daniel J. Meltzer recently summarized the state of the law by
describing an ascending scale of rights accused enemy combatants
possess, determined by the detainees' citizenship, place of seizure, and
site of detention.13 Corresponding to the varying strengths of the
detainees' rights are varying degrees of judicial review available in
habeas actions: the stronger the detainees' rights, the more stringent the
judicial review.' 4 Notwithstanding this profusion of scholarship on the
scope of detainees' rights, no one appears to have challenged the
10. Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. 3078, 3078 (2007) (granting writ of certiorari).
11. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Danel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029,
2031 (2007); Roberto Iraola, Enemy Combatants, the Courts, and the Constitution, 56
OKLA. L. REV. 565, 568-69 (2003); David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role
of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review,
25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125 (2005); Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great
Writ. Judicial Review, Due Process, and the Detention of Alleged Terrorists as Enemy
Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 39, 76 (2005) ("A writ of habeas corpus may only be
issued to terminate custody in violation of the Constitution or federal laws."); Tung
Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine "Enemy Combatant" Status in the War on
Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 354 (2006); Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism
Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military Detention, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1255, 1260;
Tung Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1061, 1084 (2005) (declaring that for the Guantanamo detainees' habeas
claims to proceed they "must allege custody in violation of federal law, the
Constitution, or a treaty").
12. Compare Randolph N. Jonakait, Rasul v. Bush: Unanswered Questions,
13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1129, 1141 (2005) (arguing that aliens held outside the
United States have no enforceable rights), with Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Supreme
Court's "Enemy Combatant" Decisions.- Recognizing the Rights of Non-Citizens and
the Rule of Law, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 409, 410-11 (2005) (arguing that
aliens detained abroad are entitled to constitutional rights).
13. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 2056-65; Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (describing an "ascending scale of rights" afforded to
individuals by U.S. laws depends on citizenship and connections with the United
States).
14. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 2065-70.
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premise that the detainees' habeas claims rise or fall based on the
strength of their rights.'5
This Article argues that habeas relief does not require the
possession of rights. As Part II explains, the courts have uniformly and
mistakenly concluded that the Guantanamo detainees' habeas claims, as
well as the habeas claims brought by other accused enemy combatants,
require a showing that the detainees possess cognizable rights violated
by the detentions, most especially rights protected by the Constitution.
Part III argues that, for most of the long history of habeas corpus,
courts resolved habeas claims without undertaking any inquiry into the
petitioner's rights by determining instead whether the jailer had
authority to impose the challenged detention. Habeas did not address
"rights" in the modern sense of a discrete group of personal trumps
against governmental action, such as those protected by the Bill of
Rights. Habeas did not protect rights in this sense for a simple reason:
habeas predates rights. 6 Traditionally, habeas cases were not framed in
terms of rights but in terms of power. As Chief Justice John Marshall
framed the habeas inquiry: "The question is, what authority has the
jailor to detain him?" 7 Part IV argues that the traditional habeas
inquiry into the jailer's power, not modem individual-rights analysis,
provides the best framework for resolving the Guantanamo detainee
cases because it squarely addresses the detainees' central claim that they
are not enemy combatants. As that Part shows, under traditional habeas
principles the government bears the burden of establishing, as a matter
of fact and law, that the detainees are enemy combatants and therefore
fall within the scope of the government's detention power.
15. In Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, forthcoming in
the Cardozo Law Review, Professor Franklin presents an argument that is fully in
accord with the views of the author. Franklin argues that a structural approach to the
enemy combatants cases rather than an individual-rights approach provides for greater
clarity and would in practice be more protective of individual rights than the individual-
rights approach. Franklin bases his approach on the jurisdictional-fact doctrine.
Franklin does not, however, address the issue this Article addresses: whether the
possession of individual rights is necessary to bring a habeas claim.
16. To the extent that habeas was understood to protect an individual right, it
protected a general "right of liberty," which was violated whenever imprisonment was
imposed without a lawful basis. See, e.g., ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT
OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 143 (1858); infra Part
III.A.
17. ExparteBurford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 452 (1806).
2007:1165 1169
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
II. THE GUANTANAMO CASES HAVE BEEN MISTAKENLY
ANALYZED AS INDIVIDUAL-RIGHTS CLAIMS
This Part explores how the unresolved question of whether the
Guantanamo detainees possess cognizable rights has dominated the
Guantanamo-detainee habeas litigation. Although the detainees assert
both that the detentions violate their rights and that the government
lacks authority to impose the detentions, the courts have analyzed the
cases solely in terms of individual rights. The monomaniacal focus on
whether the detainees possess enforceable rights, to the near exclusion
of all other issues raised by the detainees, has been the primary reason
that the cases have been stalled for almost six years. Because the cases
have been analyzed only in terms of the detainees' rights, the courts
have failed to address the detainees' basic challenge to executive
power.
A. The Detainees' Central Claim Is that They
Are Not Enemy Combatants
In January 2002, the United States began bringing men held by
U.S. forces in Afghanistan to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. At its peak, the Guantanamo detention center held over seven
hundred detainees, who were citizens of forty-four different countries.18
Most of the detainees were seized in Pakistan, some were seized in
Afghanistan, and others were seized in places as far afield as Gambia,
Zambia, Bosnia, and Thailand. 19 As of June 2007, after more than four
hundred detainees had been returned to their home countries,
Guantanamo held approximately 375 detainees.2 °
18. See Transcript of Defense Department Special Briefing on Administrative
Review Boards for Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, James McGarrah, Dir., Dep't
of Def. Office for the Admin. (July 8, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3171. In May 2006, the Department of Defense
released a list of the names and nationalities of the Guantanamo detainees in response to
an order under the Freedom of Information Act. The list is available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/detaineesFOIArelease l5May2006.pdf.
19. See, e.g., First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, El-Banna v.
Bush, No. 1:04-CV-01144 (D.D.C. filed July 8, 2004) (involving British petitioners
arrested in Gambia and Zambia); Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Boumediene v.
Bush, No. 1:04-CV-01166 (D.D.C. filed July 8, 2004) (involving six Algerian
permanent residents of Bosnia arrested in Sarajevo); Petition for Habeas Corpus,
Paracha v. Bush, No. 1:04-CV-02022 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 17, 2004) (involving
Pakistani citizen arrested in Thailand).
20. See News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Detainee Transfer
Announced (June 29, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/
release.aspx?releaseid = 11030.
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The government has declared the Guantanamo prisoners to be
"enemy combatants"-a novel legal category not mentioned in the
Geneva Conventions or previously established under federal law2t-who
are subject to indefinite detention under the powers given to the
President by the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)22 and
under the President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief.
23
The government has concluded that the detainees are not entitled to the
protections for prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.24
Initially, the military employed an informal and apparently unwritten
process for determining whether a detainee is an enemy combatant. 25 In
July 2004, in response to the Supreme Court's decisions in Rasul v.
Bus 26 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 7 the Department of Defense announced
that the designation of enemy combatants would be reviewed through
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), a new Department of
Defense administrative process.28
Since February 2002, around two hundred habeas petitions have
been filed on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees. 29 The heart of the
21. See David S. Udell & Rebekah Diller, Access to the Courts: An Essay for
the Georgetown University Law Center Conference on the Independence of the Courts,
95 GEO. L.J. 1127, 1144 (2007) (describing the category of "enemy combatants" as "a
category . . . without precedent in modern military operations or international law");
Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address, Symposium: State Intelligence Gathering and
International Law, 28 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 543, 548 (2007) ("In creating a new and
previously unknown category of 'unlawful enemy combatants,' the President acted
outside the scope of international law, and caused enormous harm to the United
States."); Joanna Woolman, The Legal Origins of the Term "Enemy Combatant" Do
Not Support Its Present Day Use, 7 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 145, 145 (2005).
22. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001). The AUMF gives the President the power to "use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Id.
23. See Brief for the Respondents at 41-42, Rasul v. Bush, Nos. 03-334, 03-
343 (U.S. filed March 3, 2004).
24. See Guantanamo Detainees, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/
d20040406gua.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2007); Office of the White House Press
Secretary, Fact Sheet, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
25. See Guantanamo Detainees, supra note 24 (describing a "multi-step
process" to determine if detention is necessary).
26. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
27. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
28. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary of the Navy on an
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
29. See Docket, Rasul v. Bush, No. 1:02-cv-00299 (D.D.C. opened Feb. 19,
2002); 151 CONG. REC. S12,656 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham)
1172 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
detainees' claims is that they are not enemy combatants but rather
innocent civilians seized by mistake:
Petitioners do not challenge the government's authority to
capture and detain members of enemy armed forces who
engage in combat against the United States and its allies. Nor
do petitioners challenge the government's authority to arrest
and incarcerate people who engage in acts of international
terrorism. But petitioners contend that they have not engaged
in combat against the United States or its allies and have not
participated in acts of terrorism. All they seek-and have ever
sought for the almost six years that they have been detained-
is a fair and impartial hearing at which they have the
opportunity to confront and rebut whatever accusations there
are against them and to present evidence of their own to
establish their innocence.3°
(asserting that 160 cases had been filed on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees);
Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the JAG Corps
Leadership Summit (October 23, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
speeches/2006/agspeech 061023.html ("Our civil litigators are defending more than
200 cases pending in federal courts related to detainees, including habeas petitions,
FOIA lawsuits, and tort claims."); Posting of hilzoy to Obsidian Wings, Why Are They
Doing This? (Special Habeas-Stripping Edition), http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/
obsidian wings/2006/09/whyaretheydo.html (Sept. 23, 2006, 12:06 EST) ("[W]hile
no one seems to know the exact number of habeas cases filed by the Guantanamo
detainees, estimates range from 160 to 200."); cf Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2748, 2817 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Solicitor General represents that
[h]abeas petitions have been filed on behalf of a purported 600 [Guantanamo Bay]
detainees.") (internal quotations omitted).
30. Brief for Petitioners El-Banna et al. at 9, Al Odah v. United States, No.
06-1196 (U.S. filed Aug. 24, 2007); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Al
Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (U.S. filed Mar. 5, 2007) ("All [of the petitioners]
maintain that they have never engaged in combat against the United States and are
wholly innocent of wrongdoing."); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 22, Rasul v.
Bush, Nos. Civ. A. 02-299 (CKK) and Civ. A. 02-828 (CKK) (D.D.C. 2002) ("The
detained petitioners are not enemy aliens. On information and belief, [petitioner Hicks]
had no involvement, direct or indirect, in either the terrorist attacks on the United
States September 11, 2001, or any act of international terrorism attributed by the
United States to al Qaida or any terrorist group."); First Amended Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus 21-22, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 1:04-cv-01166 (D.D.C. Aug.
20, 2004) ("The Detained Petitioners are not, nor have they ever been, enemy aliens,
lawful or unlawful belligerents, or combatants in any context involving hostilities
against the citizens, government or armed forces of the United States. . . .The
Detained Petitioners are not, nor have they ever been, 'enemy combatants' . ...");
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 486 (stating that the detainees "claim to be wholly innocent of
wrongdoing").
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The detainees' habeas claims thus focus narrowly on the validity of
their designation as enemy combatants.
The detainees rely alternatively on arguments that the detentions
exceed the President's power and that the detentions violate their
individual rights.3' In their challenge to executive authority, the
detainees argue that the President has never been granted authority by
the Constitution or by statute to impose indefinite detention on enemy
combatants under the government's broad definition of that term. The
CSRTs declared detainees to be enemy combatants if they supported al
Qaeda or the Taliban in any way-including support that was coerced,
unintentional, or unknowing-without any requirement that the
32detainees participated in combat or even supported combat operations.
The detainees further argue that, even if the government has authority
to hold enemy combatants under an appropriate definition, the
government lacks power to hold them because there is no factual basis
for their designations as enemy combatants.33
While the detainees' challenge to the government's detention
power focuses on the substance of their designation as enemy
combatants, the detainees' individual-rights claims focus on the process
by which the government made the designations. The detainees argue
that the CSRT process did not provide due process under the Fifth
Amendment.34 In the CSRTs, the detainees were not represented by
counsel but instead received advice from "personal representatives"
appointed by the military. 35 The detainees were not allowed to see any
evidence the government deemed classified, which comprised most of
the evidence offered to support the detentions.36 The detainees had no
opportunity to confront their accusers because the government called no
31. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Rasul v. Bush, supra note
30, at 1 44-53.
32. Id. at 1 28; see also infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
33. As the petitions explain, the United States dropped leaflets in Afghanistan
and Pakistan offering thousands of dollars in bounties to anyone turning in supporters
of al Qaeda or the Taliban, and, in response, local villagers turned over hundreds of
foreigners. See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A
PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA
App. 23-25, available at http:// law.shu.edu/news/guantanamoreport final 2 08
06.pdf (reproducing and translating leaflets). In addition, the detainees assert that the
detentions violate their rights under the Geneva Conventions, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international law. See, e.g., Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Rasul v. Bush, supra note 30, 11 40-49 (reciting claims).
34. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C.
2005) (holding that the CSRTs failed to provide due process).
35. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra note 28, at I c.
36. Id. I g(4); MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., NO-HEARING HEARINGS 2, 5,
available at http://law.shu.edu/news/final-no hearinghearings-report.pdf.
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witnesses and instead relied on summaries of interrogation and
intelligence reports." The detainees had no ability to argue that the
evidence against them was obtained through coercion or torture.3 The
detainees could not present any evidence unless the CSRT panels found
it was "reasonably available," which the panels rarely did.3 9 The CSRT
procedures established a presumption in favor of the government's
evidence, including the evidence kept secret from the detainees. 40 Thus,
under the CSRTs, the detainees bore the burden of proving themselves
innocent of allegations that were supported by evidence they had not
seen, made by anonymous sources they could not confront, and were
required to do so without counsel.
B. The Courts Have Analyzed the Guantanamo Detainees' Claims
Exclusively in Terms of Individual Rights
While the detainees have framed their habeas claims in terms of
both rights and power, the government has sought to keep the cases
framed solely within the paradigm of individual rights, and it has
succeeded in doing so. The government has continually argued that the
cases must be dismissed because the detainees have no rights. In doing
so, the government seeks vindication of its position that its treatment of
the detainees is unconstrained by law, at least any law that can be
judicially enforced. 41 The government appears to rely on an intuition
that judges will lack sympathy with any assertions of the rights of
terrorists bent on national destruction, who the government has
continually portrayed as the worst of the worst. 42 The government has
37. See DENBEAUX, supra note 36, at 2, 5.
38. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
39. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra note 28, g(8); DENBEAUX,
supra note 36, at 25, 31.
40. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra note 28, g(12).
41. William H. Taft IV, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State under
Colin Powell, described how ideologically driven Bush-administration lawyers had
"proposed to create a regime in which detainees were deprived of all legal rights and
the conditions of their treatment were a matter of unreviewable executive discretion.
Why lawyers, of all people, should want to establish the point that such a lawless
regime could legally exist, even as a theoretical matter, much less recommend that one
actually be created, is, I confess, beyond me .... ." William H. Taft, IV, Address: A
View from the Top: American Perspectives on International Law After the Cold War,
31 YALE J. INT'LL. 503, 509 (2006).
42. See, e.g., Transcript of Secretary Rumsfeld Roundtable with Radio
Media, Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Jan. 15, 2002), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2132 ("hardest
of the hard core" and "very hardest core terrorists"); WHITE HOUSE REPORT:
ARGENTINA, PHILIPPINES, GUANTANAMO, SOUTH ASIA (2002), available at http://
usinfo. state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/0116wthsrpt.htm; Transcript of
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repeatedly ridiculed the notion that the Constitution could be read to
provide enforceable rights to our enemies."
The government first employed the argument that the detainees
have no rights in service of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The government argued, and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit agreed, that the detainees have no rights because they
are aliens held outside the United States."* Because they have no rights,
the court concluded, the detainees could not pursue relief through
habeas: "[T]he right to a writ of habeas corpus [is] a subsidiary
procedural right that follows from the possession of substantive
constitutional rights." 45 And because the detainees lack substantive
rights, the courts lack jurisdiction to hear their claims: "if the
Constitution does not entitle the detainees to due process, and it does
not, they cannot invoke the jurisdiction of our courts to test the
constitutionality or the legality of restraints on their liberty. 46 In Rasul
v. Bush, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the federal habeas
statute provides jurisdiction, without definitively ruling that the
detainees possess cognizable rights.47
Department of Defense News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., and Richard
B. Meyers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031 ("These are
people that would gnaw hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it down ...
[T]hese are very, very dangerous people, and that's how they're being treated.");
Transcript of Department of Defense News Briefing, Victoria Clarke, ASD PA, and
John Stufflebeem, Rear Admiral (Jan. 28, 2002), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2355. Rear Admiral
Stufflebeem stated: "These are the worst of the worst, and if let out on the street, they
will go back to the proclivity of trying to kill Americans and others. So that is well
established." Id.
43. See, e.g., Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to
Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support, Hicks v.
Bush, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 4, 2004) ("Petitioners demand an
unprecedented judicial intervention into the conduct of war operations, based on the
extraordinary, and unfounded, proposition that aliens captured outside this country's
borders and detained outside the territorial sovereignty of the United States can claim
rights under the U.S. Constitution.").
44. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
45. Id. at 1140 (internal quotations omitted).
46. Id. at 1141.
47. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004). In a footnote, the Court
strongly suggested that the detainees adequately alleged a habeas claim based on a
violation of their rights:
Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in combat
nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in
executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-
term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access
to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Upon remand from Rasul, the government again invoked its
argument that the detainees possess no rights, this time arguing that the
detainees have no legal right to the advice of counsel.4" As the
government once again argued, the detainees have no protections under
the Constitution or any other sources of U.S. law because they are
foreigners held outside U.S. territory. Because the detainees had no
right to counsel, the government argued, it could monitor any
communications between the detainees and their lawyers or impose any
other reasonable restrictions on the detainees' access to counsel. 49 The
district court rejected the argument, holding that the detainees were
entitled to confidential communications with counsel in order to
proceed with their habeas claims."
The government next yoked its no-rights argument to a motion to
dismiss on the merits.5 The habeas petitions are meritless, the
government argued, because the detainees are foreigners held outside of
U.S. territory and therefore could not allege any violations of U.S. law.
The government's argument that the detainees possess no cognizable
rights was addressed by two different district-court judges, who reached
opposing conclusions. In Khalid v. Bush, Judge Richard Leon agreed
with the government that aliens held outside U.S. territory have no
cognizable rights and that the detainees' habeas petitions therefore had
to be dismissed.52 Twelve days later, Judge Joyce Hens Green ruled
that all of the detainees are entitled to fundamental due process under
the Fifth Amendment and the detainees accused of supporting the
Taliban are also entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions.53
Although Leon and Green disagreed about whether the detainees
possess any legal rights, they agreed on the underlying premise that the
detainees' ability to pursue habeas relief depends on whether they can
claim that they are held in custody in violation of rights protected by
describe "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."
Id. at 483 n.15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000)).
48. See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2004).
49. It now appears that the government's adamant assertions that national
security required monitoring the detainees' communications with counsel were
concocted by the Department of Justice, over the objections of Department of Defense
intelligence officers and legal counsel. See Tim Golden, Naming Names at Gitmo,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 21, 2007, at 78, 81.
50. Id.
51. See Individual Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and Supporting
Memorandum at 2, Hicks v. Bush, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 4, 2004).
52. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
53. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 443 (D.D.C.
2005).
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the Constitution or federal law. Leon expressly rejected the argument
that the detainees' habeas claims could proceed without any alleged
violation of rights. In a brief footnote, Leon held that the detainees'
lack of cognizable rights mandated the dismissal of their claims
challenging the President's detention authority 4.5 Green, in contrast, did
not even mention the detainees' challenge to presidential power. To
both judges, the central and dispositive question in assessing the habeas
claims was whether the detainees possess enforceable rights.
With the enactment of the MCA, the question whether the
detainees possess rights has arisen in yet another way. Enacted while
the decisions of Green and Leon were pending on appeal, the MCA
purports to overrule Rasul and withdraw the federal courts' jurisdiction
to hear the detainees' habeas claims.55 The detainees argue that the
MCA is invalid under the Suspension Clause. 6 The government
defends the constitutionality of the MCA by once again trotting out its
familiar no-rights argument: the Suspension Clause does not protect the
detainees for the same reason that the detainees are entitled to no
constitutional protections-because they are aliens held outside the
United States. In Boumediene v. Bush, the D.C. Circuit once again
agreed with the government that "the Constitution does not confer
rights on aliens without property or presence within the United
States." 57 The D.C. Circuit thus concluded that the detainees' supposed
lack of rights means that the Suspension Clause does not apply to the
MCA.
Dissenting, Judge Judith Rogers construed the Suspension Clause
to impose a limitation on congressional power rather than establish an
individual right. Rogers characterized the Suspension Clause as a
"structural" limitation on Congress, not an individual right, and
concluded that application of the Suspension Clause does not depend on
whether the detainees possess constitutional rights: "It is unclear where
the court finds that the limit on suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
is an individual entitlement." 58 According to Rogers, if Congress
exceeded the Constitution's structural limitations when it withdrew
54. Kbalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 324 n.17. Without any citation or support,
Judge Leon concluded that the habeas statute could not give the detainees "more rights
than they would otherwise possess under the Constitution." Id.
55. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat.
2600, 2635-36 (2006).
56. The Suspension Clause provides: "The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
57. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 995, 997 n.3 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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federal habeas authority, the withdrawal was void even if the detainees
possess no individual rights.5 9
The Boumediene majority, however, found that the distinction
between claims based on rights and claims based on power was
incomprehensible: "[T]he dissent offers the distinction that the
Suspension Clause is a limitation on congressional power rather than a
constitutional right. But this is no distinction at all."' Under this view,
Congress could be said to have exceeded its authority under the
Suspension Clause only if the detainees could establish a right against
it. In other words, to the Boumediene majority, power claims and rights
claims are simply two sides of the same coin.
C. The Other Enemy-Combatant Cases Have Also Been
Dominated by Individual-Rights Analysis
The dominant role that the question of the existence of individual
rights has played in the Guantanamo-detainee litigation has been
repeated in the other enemy-combatant cases. As with the habeas cases
brought by Guantanamo detainees, the habeas cases brought by Yasser
Hamdi, Jose Padilla, Salim Hamdan, Ali Al-Marri, among others, have
also focused largely, if not exclusively, on the existence and strength of
the detainees' rights. 61 The courts allowed the habeas petitions of
Hamdi and Padilla to proceed only after determining that, as American
citizens, they possess constitutional rights. 62 Likewise the court allowed
Al-Marri's habeas claim to proceed only after it concluded that he is
entitled to constitutional rights because he is detained in the United
States. 63  The D.C. Circuit rejected Hamdan's habeas petition
challenging the legality of military commissions on the ground that
Hamdan lacked any enforceable rights under the Geneva Conventions
or any other source. 4 In perhaps the only exception to the courts'
reliance on individual-rights analysis, the Supreme Court reversed the
Hamdan decision on the merits, ruling that the military commissions
59. Id. at 997 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 993.
61. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2753 (2006); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007);
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
62. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 464-65 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003).
63. AI-Marri, 487 F.3d at 174-75.
64. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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were not authorized by federal law, without determining whether the
military commissions violated Hamdan's rights.65
As Fallon and Meltzer have recently summarized, the enemy-
combatant cases, taken together, have created a sliding scale of
constitutional rights based on the detainees' citizenship, where they
were seized, and where they are detained.66 At one end of the spectrum
are American citizens seized in the United States and detained on U.S.
soil, who have the full protection of the Constitution and federal laws.67
On the other end are foreign citizens detained outside the United States,
who have few or no rights.68 In between lie detainees who have rights
of varying strengths-for instance, Americans detained abroad and
foreigners detained in the United States.69
Under the courts' decisions in the enemy-combatant cases, the
strength of the detainees' rights determines the scope of executive
power to detain them as well as the scope of judicial power to review
the detentions. As a result, the first and likely dispositive question to be
resolved in any habeas case challenging executive detention is a
determination of the existence and strength of the detainees' rights.
Under this scheme, detainees possessing strong rights are entitled to
searching judicial review, detainees possessing weak rights are entitled
only to cursory review, and detainees possessing no rights are entitled
to no review. Corresponding to the spectrum of individual rights are
spectra of executive power and judicial review. The executive branch
has the least amount of power in its treatment of Americans seized and
detained in the United States: they can only be imprisoned based on a
criminal trial.7 The executive branch has the most power in its
treatment of foreigners held outside the United States: they can be
imprisoned forever without judicial review, can be transferred to
countries that engage in torture, and presumably can be tortured
without judicial interference. In between lie cases in which the
65. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note
11, at 2088 ("In Hamdan, the Supreme Court conducted a classic habeas corpus inquiry
into whether executive detention was authorized by law.").
66. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 2065-89.
67. Id. at 2066-82.
68. Id. at 2087-88.
69. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Professors
Fallon and Meltzer consider Guantanamo an intermediate case because it is neither
wholly foreign nor wholly sovereign territory. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at
2058-60, 2088-89.
70. See AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
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government can impose detention on the basis of something less than
criminal standards and can engage in perhaps just a little torture.7'
III. TRADITIONAL HABEAS ACTIONS ADDRESS QUESTIONS OF
POWER RATHER THAN RIGHTS
Claims that imprisonment violates the petitioners' rights have
become so prevalent in contemporary habeas practice that it is easy to
miss a fundamental fact about habeas history-habeas predates rights.
This Part explores that history and shows that, until the modern era,
habeas cases were not framed in terms of the prisoners' rights. Instead,
courts in habeas cases determined whether detention was lawful by
demanding that jailers establish that they had acted within the scope of
their lawful authority. This history is especially relevant in analyzing
the habeas claims brought by the Guantanamo detainees and other
accused enemy combatants because the Suspension Clause and the
original grant of federal habeas authority, section 14 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, embody traditional habeas standards. These standards
remain vital parts of federal habeas law.72 While federal habeas power
has expanded considerably since 1789, the writ is constitutionally
protected today at least to the extent it was available in 1789."3 Because
habeas cases proceeded in 1789 without any requirement that the
petitioner establish or even allege a violation of rights, no such
requirement can be imposed today. 74
71. Professor Lederman and others sometimes use the term "torture light" to
describe various harsh interrogation techniques such as waterboarding, stress positions,
hypothermia, and threatening the death of loved ones. See, e.g., Posting of Marty
Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/05/has-congress-
prohibited-torture-light.html (May 11, 2005, 6:03 EST); Seth F. Kreimer, "Torture
Lite, " "Full Bodied" Torture, and the Insulation of Legal Conscience, 1 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y, 187 (2005).
72. Section 14 is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (2000). See INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 n.25 (2001).
73. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 ("[Alt the absolute minimum, the Suspension
Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789.'" (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651, 663-64 (1996)).
74. To be clear, this Article does not suggest that the standards and practices
employed in habeas cases in 1789 are the best or most correct habeas standards or that
contemporary habeas law has mistakenly diverged from the writ's fundamental
purposes. That is, this Article is not guided by what one commentator has characterized
as "the vision of a single true writ of habeas corpus." Steven Semeraro, Two Theories
of Habeas Corpus, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 1233, 1244 (2006). Instead, this Article
proceeds from the premise, accepted by the Supreme Court, that the extent of habeas
protections guaranteed in 1789 represent the minimum constitutional protection against
unlawful detention, and no one should be imprisoned today who would have been freed
in 1789.
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Section A shows that, by the late seventeenth century, habeas
actions were governed by well-established procedures, standards, and
burdens of proof, which focused the courts' inquiries on the jailers'
power and did not require a determination of whether the petitioners
possessed any legal rights. Section B discusses the application of those
standards in the United States and explains that federal habeas
protection was understood from the outset to embody traditional habeas
standards. A comprehensive review of the 124 reported federal habeas
cases decided between the establishment of federal habeas authority in
1789 and its expansion in 1867 demonstrates that federal courts
uniformly engaged in the traditional habeas inquiry into the custodian's
authority and did not depend on claims that detention violated
petitioners' rights. Section C discusses the modem trend of framing
habeas claims in terms of individual rights, which began roughly with
the adoption of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 and accelerated during
the twentieth century. As that Section argues, federal habeas claims can
now be based on almost any asserted violation of individual rights.
Although habeas relief can be based on individual-rights claims, it
does not follow that establishing a violation of rights is required to
make out a habeas claim. Habeas provides a remedy for "unlawful
imprisonment, 75  and, broadly speaking, imprisonment can be
"unlawful" in two ways-when it violates specific rights protected by
law or when the jailer lacks power to impose it. 76 Traditional habeas
claims challenging unauthorized executive detention, the historical core
of habeas law, remain available under federal law without regard to
rights.
75. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908); see also Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 649, 653 (1840) ("If a party is unlawfully imprisoned, the
writ of habeas corpus is his appropriate legal remedy.").
76. See, e.g., IX THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 184-
85 (John Houston Merrill ed., 1889) (declaring that habeas relief must be granted if the
petition establishes that "the imprisonment is illegal, or that there is no reasonable
ground for detention"). Professors Fallon and Meltzer declare that habeas petitioners
challenging the lawfulness of detention can raise three types of claims:
The first kind focuses on separation-of-powers matters: does the Executive
possess authority-either with or without congressional authorization, or in
the teeth of a congressional prohibition-to detain? The second involves
claims of protected constitutional rights: for example, even with
congressional authorization, the Executive could not detain a citizen merely
for voicing opposition to a war. The third involves claims of
subconstitutional rights-in statutes or treaties-to be free from detention in
specified circumstances.
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 2039. This Article refers to the first type of habeas
claim as a claim of unauthorized detention and the second two types as individual-rights
claims.
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A. Habeas Developed as a Check on Imprisonment Power,
Not as a Protection of Individual Rights
When the writ of habeas corpus was developing under English
law, the concept of legal rights was in its infancy.77 The modem
conception of rights involves what rights theorists characterize as
"subjective rights" -personal privileges or powers inherent in
individuals that the government cannot take away except in
extraordinary circumstances or with strong justifications-that is, the
conception of rights as "trumps." 78 Rather than protecting discrete
individual rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel,
or the right to confrontation, the writ of habeas corpus developed as a
means of ensuring that detention could only be imposed based on lawful
authority. Habeas cases focused on the jailer's power.79 To the extent
that habeas was characterized as protecting prisoners' rights, it was not
understood to protect discrete individual rights but rather to protect a
general "right to liberty," which was violated whenever imprisonment
was imposed without a lawful basis.8" Habeas thus was established as a
77. See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL
RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625 (1997); Brian Tierney, Historical
Roots of Modern Rights: Before Locke and After, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 23 (2005);
Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Medieval Origins of the Western Natural Rights Tradition:
The Achievement of Brian Tierney, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 437 (1998); Kenneth
Pennington, The History of Rights in Western Thought, 47 EMORY L.J. 237 (1998);
James H. Hutson, The Emergence of the Modern Concept of a Right in America: The
Contribution of Michel Villey, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 185 (1994).
78. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194 (1977) ("A
right against the Government must be a right to do something even when the majority
thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for
having it done."); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 36 (1980) (asserting
that "rights and powers are not simply the absence of one another but that rights can cut
across or trump powers"). But see Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps:
Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725,
727 (1998).
79. As Justice Cooley explained in 1867:
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon
this writ is, that it is directed to, and served upon, not the person confined,
but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter ...
The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent.
In re Jackson, 15 Mich. 416, 439-40 (1867); see also Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,
306 (1944) (quoting Jackson).
80. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
129-37 (1788) (characterizing the "personal liberty of the subject" as a "natural
inherent right, which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of
some great and atrocious crime, nor ought to be abridged in any case without the
special permission of law"); HURD, supra note 16, at 143.
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mechanism to protect the rule of law, a broader concept than individual
rights.
From its earliest uses, the central purpose of habeas has been to
require that jailers justify the legal cause of detentions.81 The earliest
known uses of the English-common-law writs of habeas corpus were in
the thirteenth century, when several related writs were employed to
compel the appearance of a person in court.82 These writs had in
common the Latin phrase "habeas corpus," a command to "have the
body" brought to court.83 One of the early habeas writs, the writ of
habeas corpus cum causa, was so named because it required courts to
make an inquiry into the cause of detention.8" Beginning in the sixteenth
century, the crown courts expanded the use of these writs to resolve
conflicts with rival courts and other quasi-judicial bodies. 85 As part of
this expansion, the crown courts required the courts to clearly declare a
sufficient legal cause to justify the imprisonments and detentions that
they ordered. 6 In this way, the writ was used to test the legality of the
"cause" of imprisonment.
By the sixteenth century, the writ began to be employed to
challenge the legality not only of detention by inferior courts but by
executive officials as well. 87 The English courts used writs of habeas
corpus to demand that the crown's officers provide justifications for
holding political prisoners. 8  For instance, in 1587, the Court of
Common Pleas issued a writ of habeas corpus to produce the body of a
81. See, e.g., HURD, supra note 16, at 255 ("[Tlhe aim and effect of the writ
is to require the defendant to show the cause of the imprisonment."); JOSEPH STORY, 2
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1339 (Melville M.
Bigelow ed., 1891) (describing habeas corpus as "the appropriate remedy to ascertain
whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his
confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his
immediate discharge").
82. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
12-23 (1980).
83. Id. at 17.
84. See DUKER, supra note 82, at 24-25; Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus
Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ-II, 18 CAN. B. REV. 172, 197
(1940).
85. See DUKER, supra note 82, at 62; Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story
of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509,
2521-22 (1998).
86. See DUKER, supra note 82, at 41-43; R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS
CORPUS 5 (1976).
87. Rollin Hurd traced the earliest uses of the writ against the crown to the
reign of Henry VII, who ruled England from 1485 to 1509. HURD, supra note 16, at
145; see also SHARPE, supra note 86, at 7 (declaring that by the late 1500s, habeas
corpus had been "shown to be a remedy fit to challenge the authority of the crown").
88. See DUKER, supra note 82, at 41-43.
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man named Hellyard, who was held by royal command at Fleet
Prison.89 In response, the warden of the prison submitted a return
simply explaining that Hellyard was being held by the command of Sir
Francis Walsingham, the Secretary of State. 9° The court ruled that the
return was inadequate because "the warden did not shew in his retorn
for what cause the said Hellyard was committed." 9 Likewise, in Addis'
Case of 1615, the jailer's return to the writ merely declared that the
prisoner was held for matters concerning the king, but the court held
the return insufficient "for it shews not for what causes he was
committed. "92
Although these cases required that even the crown had a duty to
explain the legal basis for holding prisoners, the principle was not
firmly established until 1679. Controversy erupted in 1627 in the
seminal Five Knights Case, also known as Danel's Case, over whether
the king's word alone was sufficient to establish sufficient legal cause. 93
The Five Knights Case arose when the king ordered suspected state
enemies detained based solely upon his special command and sought to
block any judicial inquiry into the basis for their confinement. 94 The
prisoners argued that, unless criminal charges were brought,
"imprisonment shall not continue on for a time, but for ever; and the
subjects of this kingdom may be restrained of their liberties
perpetually," in violation of the Magna Carta. 95 The court, however,
sided with the king. 96
Parliament strongly objected to the suggestion that the king and his
officers enjoyed unchecked detention authority and responded by
enacting a series of statutes to prohibit detention without a legal cause.
In 1628, Parliament enacted the Petition of Right, which prohibited
89. Hellyard's Case, (1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 455 (K.B.).
90. Id
91. Id. Five years after Hellyard's Case, the court declared that "her
Majesties Writs have sundry times been directed to divers persons having the custody
of such persons unlawfully imprisoned, upon which Writs no good or lawful cause of
imprisonment hath been returned or certified: whereupon according to the Laws they
have been discharged from their imprisonment." (1592) 123 Eng. Rep. 482 (C.P.D.).
92. Addis' Case, (1615) 79 Eng. Rep. 190-91 (K.B.); see also Searches Case,
(1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 65-66 (K.B.) (discharging prisoner for insufficient cause stated in
return); Peter's Case, (1586) 74 Eng. Rep. 628 (K.B.) (same).
93. Darnel's Case, (1627) 3 Cobbett St. Tr. 1, 4 (K.B.); see also DUKER,
supra note 82, at 43-44; 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 133-34.
94. Darnel's Case, (1627) 3 Cobbett St. Tr. 1, 37 (K.B.).
95. Id. at 8; see also MAGNA CARTA art. 39 (1215) ("No free man shall be
seized or imprisoned ... except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of
the land.").
96. Darnel's Case, (1627) 3 Cobbett St. Tr. 1, 59 (K.B.).
1184
Habeas Without Rights
97imprisonment upon royal command and without formal charges.
When the king nonetheless continued to impose imprisonment without
charges, Parliament enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1641, which
commanded the king's custodians to provide a legal basis for a
prisoner's detention and instructed judges to act "without delay" in
response to a petition for habeas corpus. Under the 1641 Act,
whenever the legal authority of any person holding another was
challenged through a petition for habeas corpus, the custodian was
required to "certify the true cause of such his detainer or
imprisonment," and the court was required to "proceed to examine and
determine whether the cause of such commitment appearing upon the
said return be just and legal, or not." 99 When even the 1641 Act proved
ineffective, Parliament adopted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which
remedied various procedural flaws that had prevented prompt judicial
inquiry into the legality of confinement."
With the adoption of the 1679 Act, habeas became, in William
Blackstone's words, an effective remedy for "all manner of illegal
confinement."' The writ was available to challenge unlawful restraints
by private actors as well as imprisonment ordered by the King,
Parliament, or the courts.10 2 Blackstone declared that the 1679 Act
represented a "second magna carta and stable bulwark of our liberties"
because it effectively prohibited imprisonment without lawful
authority.0 3 The writ served its function by requiring anyone
restraining another's liberty to provide legal justification for the
restraint and requiring the courts to determine if the justification was
valid.'0 4 Under the 1641 and 1679 Habeas Corpus Acts, the ultimate
issue in all habeas cases was whether the jailer could establish a legal
"cause" to justify the detention. In 1758, the Chief Justice of the Court
of Common Pleas described the writ as a judicial command to the
97. 3 Car. 1, c. 1, §§ 5, 10 (1628) (Eng.).
98. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1641, 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (1641) (Eng.); DUKER,
supra note 82, at 47; 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 129-35. The 1641 Act applied
only to government-imposed detention, but the common-law writ remained available to
challenge private detention. See Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng.
Rep. 29, 43 (K.B.).
99. An Act for the Regulation of the Privy Council and for Taking Away the
Court Commonly called the Star-Chamber, 1641, 16 Car. 1, c. 10, § 8; see DUKER,
supra note 82, at 47.
100. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2; see DUKER, supra note
82, at 48-58.
101. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 131.
102. HuRD, supra note 16, at 147.
103. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 133
(1766).
104. See HuRD, supra note 16, at 144.
2007:1165 1185
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
custodian to "[tlell the reason why you confine him. The Court will
determine whether it is a good or bad reason."0 5 A group of legal
historians recently described the writ in similar terms: its "very essence
. . . its substance-was a searching inquiry by neutral judges into the
factual and legal validity of the [executive's] proffered justification for
the detention. "106
Judicial inquiry into the legal cause of detention required the jailer
to establish with strict precision the legal authority for holding the
petitioner. As Blackstone explained:
[T]he glory of the English law consists in clearly defining the
times, the causes, and the extent, when, wherefore, and to
what degree, the imprisonment of the subject may be lawful.
This induces an absolute necessity of expressing upon every
commitment the reason for which it is made; that the court
upon an [sic] habeas corpus may examine into it's [sic]
validity; and according to the circumstances of the case may
discharge, admit to bail, or remand the prisoner.107
As Blackstone thus made clear, sufficient justification for detention can
only be based upon positive law, whether under the common law or
statute, which clearly defines and limits the circumstances in which
detention can be authorized and by whom. 108
105. Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 43
(K.B.) (internal quotations omitted).
106. Supplemental Brief Amici Curiae of British and American Habeas
Scholars Listed Herein in Support of Petitioners Addressing Section 1005 of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 at 12, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (No. 05-5064).
107. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 133.
108. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 103, at 132-33 ("To make imprisonment
lawful, it must either be, by process from the courts of judicature, or by warrant from
some legal officer, having authority to commit to prison; which warrant must be in
writing, under the hand and seal of the magistrate, and express the causes of the
commitment, in order to be examined into (if necessary) upon a habeas corpus."); see
also HURD, supra note 16, at 256 ("To justify the detention, the return must show it to
be founded on sufficient authority, either public or private."); Gerald L. Neuman,
Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv.
961, 987 (1998) ("Executive detention always requires affirmative authorization in
positive law."). Legal authority for imposing detention could be established by statute
or by common law. For instance, English common law authorized husbands, fathers,
guardians, and masters to impose restraints "in order to enforce a performance of those
natural, moral, and civil duties, which wives, children, wards, and apprentices, owe to
their superiors." Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 36
(K.B.). Thus, in habeas actions challenging private detentions, courts looked to whether
the common law granted the custodian authority to impose the detention and whether he
had acted in accordance with that authority.
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The 1641 and 1679 Habeas Corpus Acts codified not only the
common-law standard for issuing habeas relief, the lack of a valid
cause of detention, but also codified the procedures for determining
whether detention was based on lawful authority. Under these Acts, the
petitioner began a habeas action by submitting a request for the writ.
When the petition on its face demonstrated the validity of the detention,
the court would dismiss the petition."° If, on the other hand, the
petition established probable cause for concluding that the petitioner
was being held without a lawful basis, courts had no discretion but
were required to issue the writ. 1° Upon receiving the writ, the
custodian was required to submit a "return," which certified the
"cause" of detention, and bring the petitioner to court. " The court then
was required to examine that cause and determine whether it was
sufficient to establish a lawful detention. 12 If the court ruled the cause
insufficient, it would order the custodian to discharge the petitioner. "3
As the traditional habeas standards and procedures make clear,
habeas corpus historically served as a mechanism for ensuring that
detention was imposed only on the basis of lawful authority. To
determine whether detention was authorized-that is, whether a
sufficient legal "cause" supported the detention-courts asked whether
the jailer could show that, by statute or otherwise, he had been granted
power to impose imprisonment and that, in imprisoning the petitioner,
he had acted within the scope of that power. Habeas courts thus had no
occasion to ask whether the petitioner's "rights" had been violated
because the only right at issue was the right not to be imprisoned
109. See HURD, supra note 16, at 255.
110. Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 36
(K.B.) (stating that courts would not issue writs of habeas corpus "upon a mere
suggestion; but upon some proof of a wrong and injury done to a subject"); 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 132-33 ("[I]f a probable ground be shewn, that the
party is imprisoned without just cause, . . . the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of
right, which may not be denied, but ought to be granted to every man that is
committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command
of the king, the privy council, or any other."); see also DUKER, supra note 82, at 5
("Once probable ground was shown that the party was committed for no crime, or that
he was imprisoned for a crime by a person or an organ lacking jurisdiction, habeas
corpus became a matter of right. If doubt existed whether a crime was committed or
not, or whether the party was committed by a competent jurisdiction, or there appeared
to be a bailable crime, habeas corpus again would be granted as a matter of right.").
111. See HURD, supra note 16, at 239, 243.
112. The 1679 Act maintained the common law's focus on whether the jailer
could establish his lawful authority for imposing detention. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,
31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 11 (1679) (Eng.) (requiring the jailer to "certify the true causes of his
detainer or imprisonment").
113. See3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 133.
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without legal cause, an inquiry resolved by determining the scope of the
jailer's authority.
B. Until the Modem Era, Federal Habeas Actions Followed
Traditional Habeas Standards by Focusing on the
Custodian's Authority, Not the Petitioner's Rights
Federal habeas authority was established in 1789 with the
ratification of the Constitution, which expressly limits Congress's
power to suspend the writ, and with the enactment of section 14 of the
Judiciary Act, which authorizes federal courts to issue the writ for
federal prisoners. 1"4 As this Section shows, the writ of habeas corpus
protected by federal law in 1789 was the familiar writ described by
Blackstone, and the standards and procedures for issuing habeas relief
were well established: the jailer was required to establish his lawful
authority for imposing detention; authority was only lawful if
established by positive law; and, in cases of executive detention, courts
would scrutinize the proffered basis with exacting scrutiny. Federal
habeas actions thus did not require the petitioner to make any showing
of a violation of rights, except to the extent that unauthorized detention
itself was understood to violate the petitioner's "right of liberty."
Although the traditional habeas action has become neglected, it
remains a part of federal law. The habeas standards established in 1789
have never been altered by Congress or the Supreme Court, and section
14 is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1).1 15
1. THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AND THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789
EMBODY THE TRADITIONAL HABEAS PROTECTION
AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED DETENTION
The foundational grants of federal habeas authority-the
Suspension Clause and section 14 of the Judiciary Act-incorporate
what by 1789 were well-established habeas standards, which focus on
the jailer's authority, not the prisoner's rights. The Suspension Clause
in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, provides: "The privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. " "'
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act, adopted six months after the
Constitution went into effect, provides that "the justices of the supreme
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
115. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 n.25 (2001); Carbo v. United
States, 364 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1961) (both reviewing statutory history of section 14).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of
commitment." 117 The texts of the Suspension Clause and Judiciary Act
are quite sparse, and, as Marshall observed, neither expressly defines
habeas corpus or provides any guidance upon what grounds the writ
should issue." 8 From the outset, however, these provisions have been
understood to incorporate the habeas standards that had developed
under English law. As Marshall declared, the term "habeas corpus"
was "well understood" in 1789, and the content of habeas corpus could
be gleaned from a historical understanding of the traditional writ.' As
Marshall declared, "[Flor the meaning of the term habeas corpus,
resort may unquestionably be had to the common law."' 20
By authorizing federal courts to employ the writ of habeas corpus
"for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment," section
14 of the Judiciary Act makes clear that federal habeas law embodies
traditional habeas standards.' 2 ' Judicial review of the legality of the
"cause" of imprisonment had long been the traditional function of
habeas, as codified in the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1641 and 1679, which
117. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The term
"commitment" was never given a technical meaning by federal courts and instead was
understood simply to refer to any restraint on liberty. After thoroughly reviewing cases
construing the term, one district court concluded that "[i]n no case known and
accessible to this court, has it ever been held that United States courts of original
jurisdiction cannot issue the writ where a person is held in illegal restraint under or by
color of the authority of the United States, whether there has been a technical
commitment or not." In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17, 27 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No.
8,751).
118. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830) ("No law of the
United States prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall be issued, nor the
power of the court over the party brought up by it.").
119. Id.
120. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807). As Dallin Oaks
remarked, ever since Bollman "the history of this venerable remedy has played an
important role in the Supreme Court." Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451, 451 (1966); see also James S.
Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?." The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct
Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 1999 (1992) ("[A] proper determination of
the Great Writ's future requires an accurate understanding of its past.").
121. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The 1875 revision
to the federal laws codified section 14 at Revised Statutes § 752 and made slight
changes to the statutory language, authorizing federal courts "to grant writs of habeas
corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty." Habeas
Corpus, ch. 13, § 752, Rev. Stat. (1873-74); see Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S.
611, 616 (1961) (reviewing statutory history of section 14). In 1948, that section was
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and the quoted words were omitted, as the statutory
revisor explained, because they were understood to be "merely descriptive of the writ."
See Carbo, 364 U.S. at 619 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2646, at A169 (1945); H.R. Rep.
No. 308, at A177-A178 (1946)).
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required English courts to "examine and determine whether the cause
of such commitment appearing upon the said return be just and legal, or
not." "'22 The conclusion that the original grants of federal habeas
authority incorporated traditional habeas standards is bolstered by
Federalist No. 84, in which Alexander Hamilton stated:
The observations of the judicious Blackstone in reference to
[habeas corpus], are well worthy of recital. "To bereave a
man of life (says he) or by violence to confiscate his estate,
without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious
an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of
tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the
person by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings
are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."
And as a remedy for this fatal evil, he is everywhere
peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas corpus
act, which in one place he calls "the BULWARK of the
British Constitution."1
2 3
Federalist No. 84 thus makes clear that the "habeas corpus"
protected by the Suspension Clause is the familiar writ praised by
Blackstone and codified in "the habeas corpus act," that is, the famous
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.124 As Hamilton explained, the writ
protected against "arbitrary imprisonments," that is, imprisonments
without legal cause, which was precisely the standard codified under
English habeas traditions. 25 Because traditional habeas standards did
122. Act for the Abolition of the Court of Star Chamber, Statutes of the Realm,
July 5, 1641, 16 Car. 1, c. 10, § 8 (1641) (Eng.). The recognition that section 14 was
intended to serve the traditional habeas function should also carry over to the
Suspension Clause because the Judiciary Act was enacted by many of the constitutional
framers, and it has long been characterized as "a contemporaneous exposition of the
Constitution," Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821), in which
Congress gave "this great constitutional privilege ... life and activity," Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95.
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 557 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead
Earle ed., 1937) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1788)).
124. Id.; see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 135; Habeas Corpus Act of
1679, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
125. The ratification debates also suggest that the writ protected by the
Suspension Clause referred to the traditional writ. Several state legislatures that ratified
the Constitution sought to clarify that the habeas corpus enshrined in Article I was the
traditional writ. Thus, Virginia endorsed an amendment that provided "that every
freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy, to enquire into the lawfulness
thereof, and to remove the same if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be
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not require any showing that the petitioner's rights had been violated,
federal habeas relief likewise does not require the possession of rights.
To construe the federal habeas authority established in 1789 to
require the assertion of individual rights would strongly conflict with
Federalist conceptions prevalent in 1789 of the relationship between
governmental powers and individual rights. 2 6 In 1789, the Bill of
Rights had not been ratified. Plainly, federal habeas corpus could not
have been understood to require the assertion of rights not yet in
existence. In Federalist No. 84, Hamilton argued that a bill of rights
was unnecessary because, among other things, the Constitution includes
the Suspension Clause, which protects against "arbitrary
imprisonments, [which] have been in all ages the favourite and most
formidable instruments of tyranny." 2' Because the Constitution
guaranteed that the writ of habeas corpus was available as a remedy
against imprisonment without cause, Hamilton argued, no additional
constitutional protection of individual rights was necessary.
The Suspension Clause and section 14 of the Judiciary Act
promote the Federalist project of protecting individual liberty by
limiting the government's powers, not by enumerating discrete
individual rights.2 8 Enumerated individual rights were unnecessary, the
Federalists argued, because the Constitution establishes sufficient
structural mechanisms to ensure that the government operates within its
limited powers. As Justice Joseph Story later explained, habeas served
as the "great bulwark of liberty" not by protecting a discrete set of
individual rights but by requiring that the government act within the
bounds of its authority, that is, by imposing imprisonment only for a
lawful cause. 129 Habeas thus served to protect individual freedom
denied or delayed," and similar recommendations were endorsed by the conventions of
Rhode Island and North Carolina. DUKER, supra note 82, at 134.
126. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5,
1789), reprinted in, 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION: 1786-1870, at
221-22 (U.S. Dep't of State ed., 1905) ("If a line can be drawn between the powers
granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter
to be secured ... by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that the former shall
not be extended.").
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 557 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead
Earle ed., 1937).
128. See Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1225 (1990) ("[T]he founding generation was
very comfortable with the idea that structural provisions, including provisions that
define governmental powers and clarify that powers not granted are reserved, constitute
individual rights provisions of the first order.").
129. 2 STORY, supra note 81, at § 1339 ("It is, therefore, justly esteemed the
great bulwark of personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain
whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his
confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his
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against tyranny, but it did so by focusing on whether detention
exceeded the government's powers.
2. FEDERAL HABEAS CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 14 OF THE JUDICIARY
ACT FOCUSED ON POWER, NOT RIGHTS
Federal habeas actions brought under section 14 of the Judiciary
Act followed traditional habeas procedures and standards and offered
relief when imprisonment was imposed without legal authority. 3 ' As a
result, the vast majority of federal habeas actions under section 14 were
framed as challenges to the government's detention powers, not as
claims that discrete individual rights were violated. Indeed, in the 124
reported federal habeas decisions between 1789 and 1867, only five
involve allegations that the petitioners rights were violated."'3 All of the
other reported federal habeas cases involve allegations that detention
was unauthorized by law.
Ex parte Burford, one of the first cases decided under section 14,
is particularly instructive on judicial inquiry in federal habeas cases.'32
The habeas petition in that case was filed by John Atkins Burford, who
had been imprisoned based on a warrant alleging that he had a
notorious reputation and was likely to incite criminal activities.
Specifically, the warrant stated that Burford was a man:
not of good name and fame, nor of honest conversation, but
an evil-doer and disturber of the peace of the United States,
so that murder, homicide, strifes, discords, and other
grievances and damages, amongst the citizens of the United
States, concerning their bodies and property, are likely to
arise thereby. 33
The petition alleged that detention was unauthorized because the
"warrant states no offence."' 34 In evaluating the petition and awarding
immediate discharge."); see also Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System As Bill Of
Rights: Original Understandings, Modem Misreadings, 43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 17-18
(1998) ("[Olur familiarity with the modem judiciary's reliance upon specific textual
rights provisions as trumps against otherwise valid claims of legislative authority has
blinded us to the fact that [to the Constitution's Framers] claims based on a lack of
governmental authority are also individual rights claims.").
130. As Rollin Hurd explained in 1858, under American habeas law "the
general principles of practice are substantially the same as those prevailing at common
law and under [the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679]." HURD, supra note 16, at 209.
131. See infra note 155.
132. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
133. Id. at 450-51.
134. Id. at 452.
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habeas relief, Marshall framed the Court's inquiry solely in terms of
the government's power: "The question is, what authority has the jailor
to detain him?"135 The Court found that the custodian lacked power to
hold Burford because he failed to "express the cause [of commitment]
with convenient certainty" and because he failed to demonstrate "that
such cause be a good one." 136 The Court thus granted habeas relief, not
because Burford had identified a right violated by the imprisonment,
but because "the warrant of commitment was illegal, for want of stating
some good cause certain, supported by oath. "1
37
Before 1867, when Congress expanded federal habeas authority,
federal courts issued 124 reported decisions in habeas cases, and all of
these cases were understood to pose the same question raised by
Burford-"what authority has the jailor to detain him?" These decisions
include a wide range of claims challenging the scope of federal
detention and imprisonment powers: in nine cases, petitioners
challenged federal authority to hold them pending extradition;'38 in
twelve cases, petitioners challenged the scope of the detention powers
of a military commission; 3 9  in twenty-three cases, petitioners
challenged military custody on the ground that they were exempt from
service; 0 in six cases, petitioners alleged that the arrest warrant or
135. Id.
136. Id. at 453.
137. Id.
138. Exparte Van Aernam, 28 F. Cas. 931 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1854) (No. 16,824);
In re Heilbronn, 11 F. Cas. 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1854) (No. 6,323); In re Kaine, 14 F.
Cas. 84 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 7,598); In Re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103
(1852); In re Pederson, 19 F. Cas. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 10,899a); In re
Veremaitre, 28 F. Cas. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 16,915); In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 176 (1846); In re Sheazle, 21 F. Cas. 1214 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 12,734);
Exparte Anthony, 1 F. Cas. 1045 (1806) (No. 485).
139. Ex pate Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 4,303); In re Bickley, 3 F. Cas. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1865)
(No. 1,387); In re Dugan, 6 D.C. 131 (1865); In re Blum, 3 F. Cas. 752 (D. Mass.
1863) (No. 1,572); Exparte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No.
16,816); Exparte Field, 9 F. Cas. 1 (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4,761); In re Winder, 30
F. Cas. 288 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 17,867); Ex parte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159
(N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1,292); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md.
1861) (No. 9,487); In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17, 18 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8,751);
In re Biddle, 30 F. Cas. 965 (C.C.D.C. 1855) (No. 18,236).
140. In re Conley, 6 F. Cas. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 3,102); In re
McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 33 (D. Mass. 1866) (No. 8,752); Antrim's Case, 1 F. Cas.
1062 (E.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 495); Stingle's Case, 23 F. Cas. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1863) (No.
13,458); In re Fagan, 8 F. Cas. 947 (D. Mass. 1863) (No. 4,604); In re Irons, 13 F.
Cas. 98 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863) (No. 7,066); Exparte Burke, 4 F. Cas. 731 (E.D. Pa.
1863) (No. 2,156a); McCall's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1225 (E.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 8,669); In
re Dunn, 8 F. Cas. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1863) (No. 4,171); United States v. Taylor, 28 F.
Cas. 22 (D.N.J. 1863) (No. 16,439); United States ex rel. Henderson v. Wright, 28 F.
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indictment stated no offense punishable by the court;' 4 1 in ten cases,
petitioners alleged that they were detained by officials who had not
been granted relevant detention powers; 142 in five cases, petitioners
alleged that the law they were charged with violating was not in force
in the place of their actions;'43 and in thirteen cases, petitioners alleged
that federal law did not authorize imprisonment for debt.'44
In addition to these challenges to federal detention powers, eleven
of the federal habeas cases decided before 1867 challenged detention by
private persons,"' and ten cases challenged detention imposed by the
Cas. 796 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 16,777); United States ex rel. Turner v. Wright,
28 F. Cas. 798 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1862) (No. 16,778); United States ex rel. Murphy v.
Porter, 27 F. Cas. 599 (C.C.D.C. 1861) (No. 16,074a); United States ex rel. Rush v.
Watson, 28 F. Cas. 499 (C.C.D.C. 1856) (No. 16,650a); Bamfield v. Abbot, 2 F. Cas.
577 (D. Mass. 1847) (No. 832); In re Keeler, 14 F. Cas. 173 (D. Ark. 1843) (No.
7,637); United States v. Stewart, 27 F. Cas. 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1839) (No. 16,400); Ex
parte Brown, 4 F. Cas. 325 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 1,972); Exparte Smith, 22 F. Cas.
371 (C.C.D.C. 1826) (No. 12,967); United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946
(C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 14,497); Wilson v. Izard, 30 F. Cas. 131 (C.C.D.N.Y.
1815) (No. 17,810); United States v. Anderson, 24 F. Cas. 813 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1812)
(No. 14,449); Shorner's Case, 22 F. Cas. 8 (D. Pa. 1812) (No. 12,808).
141. Exparte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1844); Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 193 (1830); ExparteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Exparte Bennett,
3 F. Cas. 204 (C.C.D.C. 1825); Ex pate Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806);
United States v. Johns, 26 F. Cas. 616 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 15,481).
142. In re Hotchkiss, 6 D.C. 168 (1866); In re Bryant, 4 F. Cas. 514 (D. Or.
1865) (No. 2,067); Richardson's Case, 20 F. Cas. 703 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 11,778);
ExparteReed, 20 F. Cas. 404 (C.C.D.C. 1835) (No. 11,634); Exparte Williams, 29
F. Cas. 1316 (C.C.D.C. 1833) (No. 17,699); Ex parte Smith, 22 F. Cas. 372 (Ark.
Terr. Super. 1832) (12,967a); Exparte Minor, 17 F. Cas. 457 (C.C.D.C. 1823) (No.
9,643); Hernandez v. Aury, 12 F. Cas. 33 (D.S.C. 1818) (No. 6,413); Ex parte
D'Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 3,967); Exparte Anthony, 1 F.
Cas. 1045 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 485).
143. In re Hall, 6 D.C. 10 (1863); United States v. Copeland, 25 F. Cas. 646
(C.C.D.C. 1862) (No. 14,865a); United States v. Dawson, 25 F. Cas. 788 (C.C.D.
Ark. 1853) (No. 14,933); United States v. Ivy, 26 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847)
(No. 15,451); United States v. Starr, 27 F. Cas. 1296 (C.C.D. Ark. 1846) (16,379).
144. Pratt v. Fitzhugh, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 271 (1861); Ex parte Wilson, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 52 (1810); In re Snow, 22 F. Cas. 722 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No.
13,143); Ex parte Dexter, 7 F. Cas. 579 (C.C.D.C. 1844) (No. 3,854); Nelson v.
Cutter, 17 F. Cas. 1316 (C.C.D. Ohio 1844) (No. 10,104); In re Cheney, 5 F. Cas.
539 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 2,636); United States v. Dobbins, 25 F. Cas. 876
(W.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 14,971); Exparte Kennedy, 14 F. Cas. 308 (C.C.D.C. 1834)
(No. 7,698); Ex parte Bill, 3 F. Cas. 375 (C.C.D.C. 1827) (No. 1,405); Ex parte
Reardon, 20 F. Cas. 369 (C.C.D.C. 1826) (No. 11,615); Frere v. Mudd, 9 F. Cas.
805 (C.C.D.C. 1823) (No. 5,107); Gill v. Jacobs, 10 F. Cas. 373 (C.C.D.S.C. 1816)
(No. 5,426); Wilson v. Marshal of the Dist. of Columbia, 30 F. Cas. 146 (C.C.D.C.
1809) (No. 17,822).
145. Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1846); Exparte Barry, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 65 (1844); Ex parte Everts, 8 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1858) (No.
4,581); United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1855)
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states. 4 6 All of these claims were framed as challenges to the
custodian's detention authority, not as violations of individual rights.
To determine whether the custodian had authority to detain the
petitioner, courts examined the power that had been given to the
custodian under the Constitution, federal statutes, and the common law.
For instance, In re Hotchkiss arose when the District of Columbia chief
of police imprisoned George Hotchkiss, a private detective, for
disobeying the chief's order to return stolen money that the detective
had recovered.147 Hotchkiss argued that the police chief lacked authority
to imprison a civilian for contempt.'48 The court resolved the claim by
determining that neither federal statute nor the common law gave the
police chief power to imprison private citizens. '49 The scope of the
chief's legal powers did not involve any question of the petitioner's
rights. Instead, the central question in Hotckiss, like other section 14
claims, was whether the custodian had authority to impose detention.
In addition to challenging the custodian's legal authority to impose
detention, some of the section 14 cases involved fact-based challenges
to the custodian's authority to hold the petitioners. For instance, in the
landmark case of Ex parte Boilman, the Supreme Court examined
habeas petitions submitted by two prisoners charged with treason for
participating in Aaron Burr's conspiracy. 5 ° The petitioners did not
challenge the federal government's authority to impose imprisonment
for treason but instead alleged that the government had relied upon an
(No. 16,726); United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 775 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 14,926);
Bell v. English, 3 F. Cas. 102 (C.C.D.C. 1834) (No. 1,250); United States v. Green,
26 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256); Gusty v. Diggs, 11 F. Cas. 128
(C.C.D.C. 1820) (No. 5,878); Handy v. Brown, I1 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D.C. 1810) (No.
6,019); Exparte Sprout, 22 F. Cas. 1010 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 13,267); McCutchin
v. Jamieson, 16 F. Cas. 13 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 8,743).
146. This last category includes cases brought under an act that authorized
federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for petitioners detained by state officials
for acts done in pursuance of federal law. See Ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634, (1833) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (2000)); Exparte Sifford, 22 F. Cas. 105 (S.D. Ohio 1857)
(No. 12,848); Exparte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856) (No. 11,934);
Exparte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 969 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 11,935); United States
exrel. Garland v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1318 (D. Wis. 1854) (No. 15,811); Exparte
Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7,259). The remaining cases
challenging state detention prior to 1867 are Exparte McCann, 15 F. Cas. 1251 (E.D.
Tenn. 1865) (No. 8,679); Exparte Des Rochers, 7 F. Cas. 537 (C.C. Cal. 1856) (No.
3,824); United States v. Rector, 27 F. Cas. 726 (C.C.D. Ohio 1850) (No. 16,132); Ex
parte Smith, 22 F. Cas. 373 (C.C.D. I11. 1843) (No. 12,968); United States v. French,
25 F. Cas. 1217 (C.C.D.N.H. 1812) (No. 15,165).
147. In re Hotchkiss, 6 D.C. 168, 168 (1866).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
2007:1165 1195
1196 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
overly broad definition of "treason" and that the allegations did not
support charging them with treason under an appropriate definition."'
The Court heard arguments from both sides on the meaning of
"treason" and held hearings and examined in detail the affidavits and
other evidence presented to justify the petitioners' arrests.152 Declaring
that it had "fully examined and attentively considered" the
government's evidence, the Court ruled that "there is not sufficient
evidence" to uphold them.153 Under section 14, habeas was thus
available not only to challenge the custodian's general authority to
impose detention but to challenge whether, under the specific facts of
the petitioner's case, the custodian had acted within the scope of that
power.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, these early federal cases
contain "no suggestion that habeas relief in cases involving Executive
detention was only available for constitutional error."' 5 4 In fact, claims
that detention violated the petitioner's rights were exceedingly rare.
Only five of the 124 reported section 14 cases involve assertions of
individual rights, and in all but one of those cases the court refused to
reach the individual-rights claim.155 In Ex parte Watkins, for instance,
151. Id. at 125-27.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 125, 135. Numerous other cases confirm that, in common-law
habeas cases, courts routinely examined the factual underpinnings of executive
detentions. See, e.g., R v. Dawes, (1758) Eng. Rep. 486, 486 (K.B.) (declaring that
the Court "went minutely through the affidavits on both sides" in order to determine
whether a soldier had been lawfully impressed); R v. Kessel, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 486,
486 (K.B.) (ordering the petitioner released from military service after taking "time
. . . to look into the affidavits" and independently assessing the facts underlying the
detention); In re Sommersett, (1772) 20 Howell St. Tr. 1, 81 (K.B.) (holding a factual
hearing on the return); R v. Turlington, (1761) 97 Eng. Rep. 741, 741 (K.B.); King v.
Lee, (1676) 83 Eng. Rep. 482, 482 (K.B.) (considering "divers affidavits" from both
sides in deciding habeas petition); Oaks, supra note 120, at 454 n.20 (listing instances
too numerous to specify in which individuals could contradict facts in return); Hafetz,
supra note 85, at 2535.
154. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302-03 (2001).
155. Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 573-74 (1833); Ex parte
Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 875 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816); Ex parte
Field, 9 F. Cas. 1, 1 (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4,761); In re Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015,
1018 (D.S.C. 1858) (No. 1,099a); Exparte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 242 (C.C.D.
Va. 1833) (No. 11,558). Some other cases arguably involve claims that detention
violated individual rights, even though they do not use the language of rights. For
instance, in Exparte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822), the petitioner alleged that
the circuit court exceeded its authority by imprisoning him for contempt of court for
refusing to answer incriminating questions, but the basis of the claim is unclear from
the decision, and the court did not reach it. See also Exparte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
704, 710 (1835) (rejecting claim that arrest on a bench warrant following release
through habeas corpus was barred by the rule against being twice arrested for same
offense, without invoking the language of individual rights).
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the petitioner alleged that federal marshals lacked authority to imprison
him for failing to pay a fine that was excessive in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. 15 6 The Supreme Court ruled, however, that it could
not review the validity of the fine because it had been imposed by a
court of competent jurisdiction.1 7 In Ex parte Vallandigham, the
petitioner alleged that his arrest and trial by a military commission for
expressing sympathy with the Confederacy violated his constitutional
rights to free speech and jury trial, but the trial court held that it could
not rule on the validity of the military's actions, and the Supreme Court
agreed that it could not address the merits.1 58 The only federal habeas
case before 1867 that reached the merits of an individual-rights claim is
In re Bates, in which a pretrial detainee argued he was guaranteed a
right to confront witnesses prior to commitment, but the court rejected
the argument.159
These cases make clear that it was not a wholly foreign idea that
habeas relief could be granted if detention violated individual rights, but
framing habeas claims in terms of individual rights was far from the
norm. Instead, the long tradition of habeas applied by federal courts
under section 14 of the Judiciary Act focused judicial attention on the
jailer's power, not the petitioner's rights.
C Modern Habeas Actions Focus on Individual Rights
The judicial inquiry in federal habeas actions has undergone a
significant change since 1789. Little more than a hundred years after
Marshall declared that in a federal habeas case "the question is, what
authority has the [jailor] to detain him?" Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
posed the habeas inquiry in a very different way: "[W]hat we have to
deal with [is] solely the question whether [the petitioner's]
constitutional rights have been preserved."' 160 In the years between these
two decisions, federal courts shifted from conceiving of the writ solely
as a mechanism for ensuring that detention was imposed based on law
156. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 573.
157. Id. at 574.
158. ExparteVallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 922-24; ExparteVallandigham, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 243 (1863). Although the district court did not reach the merits of
Vallandigham's constitutional claims, it nonetheless commented extensively on them,
declaring that constitutional protections are necessarily diminished during wartime. See
28 F. Cas. at 923 ("I may be indulged in the remark that there is too much of the
pestilential leaven of disloyalty in the community."); see also Michael Kent Curtis,
Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti- War Speech in the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 105, 105 (1998).
159. In re Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015, 1018 (D.S.C. 1858) (No. 1,099a).
160. Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 450 (1806); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923).
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and had begun to see it as a means of protecting the expanding body of
individual rights. This shift only accelerated in the decades after
Holmes's description of the habeas inquiry. The shift had a number of
causes-the expansion of federal habeas authority under the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867, the increased willingness of federal judges to
employ habeas corpus for collateral review of state criminal
convictions, and, more generally, the ever-expanding canon of
individual rights available to criminal defendants. 161
The primary change to the text of the federal habeas statute was
made by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which authorizes federal
courts to issue habeas relief for any person in custody "in violation of
the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.'1 62 The
terms of the 1867 Act effected a significant expansion of federal habeas
authority by providing federal habeas review for state prisoners, thus
expanding exponentially the pool of potential federal habeas
petitioners. 163 The language of the 1867 Act also significantly shifted
the judicial inquiry in federal habeas actions toward individual rights.
Whereas section 14 authorizes the traditional habeas inquiry into the
"cause of commitment," the 1867 Act authorizes relief for custody
imposed in "violation" of federal law. The 1867 Act thus shifts the
judicial inquiry from whether detention is authorized to whether it is
prohibited
The legal questions posed by the federal habeas statutes of 1789
and 1867, whether detention is authorized or prohibited, may appear to
be merely two ways of asking the same question, but the two questions
actually require distinct inquiries into different sources of law. To
determine whether authorization for detention exists, a court must
determine whether the jailer has been given imprisonment power by the
Constitution, by statute, or by some other source, and the court must
also determine whether the jailer has acted within the scope of that
power. In contrast, the most prominent prohibitions on the
161. See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 82, at 248-49; DANIEL JOHN MEADOR,
HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND LIBERTY 55 (1966);
Steven Semeraro, Two Theories of Habeas Corpus, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1233, 1277
(2006).
162. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867); see DUKER, supra
note 82, at 189.
163. As explained by Senator Trumbull, then-Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, the Judiciary Act of 1789 "confines the jurisdiction of the United States
courts in using writs of habeas corpus to persons who are held under United States
laws," while the 1867 Act authorized the writ to any person "held under a State law in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States." DUKER, supra note 82, at
192. But see Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531,
541 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court erred in holding that federal habeas
authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 was limited to federal prisoners).
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government's imprisonment powers are found in the Bill of Rights,
such as the rights to due process, counsel, and trial by jury. The 1867
Act signaled a shift in the judicial focus in habeas cases away from the
sources of a jailer's power toward an inquiry into the specific rights the
Constitution provides the petitioner. This shift gained in significance as
constitutional protections for criminal defendants began to be applied to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. As state prisoners
increasingly could claim that their detention violated federal rights,
federal habeas claims increasingly began to be framed in terms of the
prisoner's rights, rather than the jailer's power."
The 1867 Act ultimately led to perhaps the most dramatic change
in federal habeas litigation-collateral review of state criminal
judgments. The traditional habeas inquiry into the jailer's authority
ordinarily meant that habeas courts engaged in minimal review of
detention imposed through judicial proceedings, and habeas courts
ordinarily reviewed only whether the sentencing court had competent
jurisdiction. 6 5 During the twentieth century, however, the Supreme
Court authorized increasingly rigorous federal habeas review of state
criminal judgments, under the guise that state courts acting contrary to
federal rights exceeded their jurisdiction.166 Eventually, the Court, by
its own admission, "discarded the concept of jurisdiction-by then
more a fiction than anything else-as a touchstone of the availability of
federal habeas review" and expressly acknowledged that habeas review
would be available "for claims of 'disregard of the constitutional rights
of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of
preserving his rights. '167
With few exceptions, federal habeas review is now available to
consider alleged violations of federal rights occurring in state courts. 168
164. The sponsors of the 1867 Act appear to have intended this change. Senator
Trumbull thus declared that "[i]t is a bill in aid of the rights of the people." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4229 (1866).
165. Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) ("This writ is, as has
been said, in the nature of a writ of error, which brings up the body of the prisoner,
with the cause of commitment. The court can undoubtedly inquire into the sufficiency
of that cause; but if it be the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction ... is not
that judgment in itself sufficient cause?"); Johnson v. United States, 13 F. Cas. 867,
868 (C.C.D. Mich. 1842) (No. 7,418) ("[I]t is clear that on the habeas corpus, the
court cannot look behind the sentence of the court, where the jurisdiction is
undoubted."); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 463-74 (1963).
166. See Bator, supra note 165, at 486-87; Oaks, supra note 120, at 451. But
see Liebman, supra note 120, at 1998.
167. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (quoting Waley v.
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942)).
168. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991) ("With the exception
of Fourth Amendment violations that a petitioner has been given a full and fair
2007:1165 1199
1200 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
At the same time, the Court greatly expanded the variety of
constitutional rights available in criminal proceedings. 6 9 Habeas corpus
became available as a mechanism to obtain federal judicial review of a
vast array of individual-rights claims that previously were not
cognizable through habeas, either because they had not yet been
recognized or because they only arose in criminal cases where habeas
review was rarely available.'70
As a result of the dual expansion of both federal habeas authority
and the scope of individual rights cognizable in habeas, federal habeas
cases became dominated by claims that judicial processes violated the
petitioner's individual rights.' 7 ' The shift from the traditional inquiry
into the jailer's authority to the modem inquiry into individual rights is
not merely a new way of phrasing the old test. Under the individual-
rights inquiry, petitioners bear the burden of identifying rights violated
opportunity to litigate in state court, the writ today appears to extend to all dispositive
constitutional claims presented in a proper procedural manner.") (internal citation
omitted).
169. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (creating the exclusionary
rule); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guaranteeing the right to assistance
of counsel); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (providing procedural
safeguards for the privilege against self-incrimination); see generally DUKER, supra
note 82, at 269 ("Because of the dramatic expansion of rights, the scope of the habeas
inquiry ballooned."); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 210-15
(2002); Michael Edmund O'Neill, Criminal Law and Procedure, 34 U. RICH. L. REv.
749, 750 (2000) (discussing "the dramatic expansion of criminal defendants' rights" by
the Warren Court).
170. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (discussing Miranda
rights); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953) (holding federal courts have habeas
corpus jurisdiction to review all constitutional issues not "fully and fairly" considered
by military tribunals); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (discussing right to
counsel); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764-65 (1945) (holding perjured testimony
violates due process); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920) (discussing Self-
Incrimination Clause of Fifth Amendment); Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915)
(discussing double jeopardy); Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425 (1905); Andersen v. Treat,
172 U.S. 24 (1898) (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); In re Converse,
137 U.S. 624 (1891) (discussing the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment);
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888) (discussing the constitutional right to jury
trial in federal criminal cases); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885). (discussing the
Fifth Amendment grand-jury right); Liebman, supra note 120, at 2082 ("[By 1948, o]n
the state-prisoner side, the range of available constitutional rights grew as slowly as
incorporationism, but all rights that did exist were enforced on habeas corpus, as on
appeal, with de novo legal review.").
171. See Louis H. Pollak, Proposals To Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 52 (1956)
("Typically, the applicant will urge that the state trial was fatally tainted by lack of
counsel, by a coerced confession, by officially suborned perjury, by discriminatory jury
selection, or by other deprivations of Fourteenth Amendment rights.") (internal
citations omitted).
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by imprisonment, while under traditional habeas standards the jailer
bears the burden of establishing the lawfulness of detention. The
judicial task in analyzing individual-rights claims requires the
application of a large variety of tests, principally balancing tests
weighing the relevant individual and governmental interests, while the
inquiry in traditional habeas claims involves a relatively straightforward
resolution of whether the government has acted within the scope of its
imprisonment powers.
With the dominance of individual-rights claims in federal habeas
actions, the traditional inquiry into the jailer's authority to impose
detention has become a largely forgotten relic of history. Courts and
commentators began to talk about habeas as if it had always been
focused on individual rights. 17 2 By the time of the Guantanamo-detainee
cases, it had become conceivable that judges who might otherwise
disagree on fundamental questions could nonetheless agree that habeas
claims could proceed only if they were based on allegations that
imprisonment violates the petitioner's individual rights.173 Traditional
habeas claims, while long neglected, nonetheless remain available
under section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, codified at 28 U.S.C. §
172. See, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) ("The writ of
habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights."); Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993) ("[Flederal habeas courts act in their historic
capacity-to assure that the habeas petitioner is not being held in violation of his or her
federal constitutional rights."); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 352 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("By the traditional understanding of habeas corpus, a
fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs whenever a conviction or sentence is secured
in violation of a federal constitutional right.") (internal quotations omitted); Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 524 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Historically, the English common-law courts permitted parents to use the
habeas writ to obtain custody of a child as a way of vindicating their own rights.");
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) ("As this Court has 'constantly
emphasized,' habeas corpus and civil rights actions are of 'fundamental importance...
in our constitutional scheme' because they directly protect our most valued rights."
(quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969)); Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536, 543 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis Court's solemn constitutional
duty [is] to preserve intact the sanctity of the Great Writ of habeas corpus and to ensure
that 'federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the
fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.'" (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 424 (1963)); Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?." The Evisceration of
Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect
Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 4 (1997) ("Traditionally, habeas
corpus review has existed to correct violations of constitutional rights."); Emanuel
Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REv. 557, 563
(1994) (stating that the Suspension Clause "mirrors the commitment of the Framers to
individual rights"); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and
the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 631 (2006) ("Habeas claims
traditionally focus on violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights.").
173. See supra Part I.
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2241(c)(1), and the Suspension Clause continues to protect them from
judicial or congressional interference.
IV. THE TRADITIONAL HABEAS INQUIRY INTO UNAUTHORIZED
DETENTION PROVIDES THE BEST ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING THE GUANTANAMO CASES
This Part seeks to illustrate how the traditional habeas inquiry into
the jailer's authority would apply in the Guantanamo detainees' cases.
As Part II showed, traditional habeas standards and procedures did not
require petitioners to establish violations of individual rights, or even to
establish that they possessed rights, but instead required the jailer to
demonstrate that the detention was authorized by law. As this Part
argues, the traditional inquiry into the government's detention powers
provides the best framework for resolving the Guantanamo detainees'
habeas claims.
As Section A explains, individual-rights analysis does not squarely
address the detainees' central claim that they are not enemy combatants
but instead focuses judicial attention on the process by which the
detainees were designated enemy combatants. Although the procedures
the government employed in designating the detainees to be enemy
combatants lacked most of the rudiments of due process, the due-
process balancing test the Supreme Court adopted in Mathews v.
Eldridge and endorsed in Hamdi is unlikely to result in searching
judicial review of the detainees' claims of innocence. By contrast, as
Section B argues, the traditional habeas inquiry into the jailer's
authority would require the courts to determine in each case whether a
sufficient basis exists in law and fact for holding the detainees as enemy
combatants.
A. Individual-Rights Analysis Is Unresponsive to the
Guantanamo Detainees' Central Claim that They
Are Not Enemy Combatants
Given the dominance of individual-rights analysis in contemporary
habeas practice, it is hardly surprising that the Guantanamo detainees'
cases have been analyzed in terms of individual rights. Individual-rights
analysis focuses judicial as well as public attention on the concrete
harms to the detainees. These detainees have been held indefinitely,
without charges, on the basis of secret evidence; deprived of contact
with the outside world; and subjected to coercive interrogation
techniques, such as stress positions, extreme temperatures, sexual
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humiliation, and the use of dogs for intimidation. These techniques
have frequently been characterized as tantamount to torture. 174 To
describe the treatment of the detainees as violating the detainees'
individual rights invokes the inviolability of all individuals, who are
understood to have fundamental rights to liberty that can only be taken
away if the government adheres to the requirements of due process.
75
Notwithstanding the appeal of individual rights as a framework for
analyzing the Guantanamo detainees' claims, it is far from clear that it
provides a mechanism for courts to resolve the detainees' claims that
they are not enemy combatants. A preliminary question for applying
individual-rights analysis, of course, is the determination of what legal
rights the petitioners possess and that question has tied up the
Guantanamo-detainee litigation for almost six years. Even if the
detainees are found to have cognizable rights, individual-rights analysis
focuses on the process by which the detainees were designated enemy
combatants, not the substance of that designation. To be sure, the
detainees have strong claims that the process they received was grossly
inadequate. Yet even if the detainees are constitutionally entitled to due
process, the Due Process Clause, as conventionally understood, may
not guarantee the detainees a stringent process for determining their
status.
The procedural-due-process balancing test is not directed to
resolving claims of innocence. Instead, under Mathews v. Eldridge,
courts attempt to determine the validity of procedures for depriving an
individual of protected liberties by weighing the individual's interests,
the government's interests, and the risks of erroneous deprivations.' 76
Applying the Mathews test, the Hamdi plurality described the task of
courts in a due-process challenge to the detention of an enemy
174. The International Committee of the Red Cross, among others, has
characterized the treatment of Guantanamo detainees as "tantamount to torture." See
Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2004, at Al. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe likewise has
concluded that many Guantanamo detainees have been subjected to treatment amounting
to torture, which "occurred systematically and with the knowledge and complicity of
the United States Government." Parl. Ass. Of the Council of Eur., 2005 Sess., Res.
No. 1433, 7(ii). See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, at
xiii (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); STEPHEN GREY, GHOST
PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (2006); JOSEPH MARGULIES,
GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006); PHYSICIANS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOWN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE
BY US FORCES (2005), available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/
documents/reports/break-them-down-the.pdf; David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and
the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2005).
175. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 129-37.
176. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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combatant as balancing the petitioner's interest in liberty and the
government's interests in national security:
It is beyond question that substantial interests lie on both sides
of the scale in this case. Hamdi's private interest . . . affected
by the official action is the most elemental of liberty
interests-the interest in being free from physical detention by
one's own government. . . .On the other side of the scale are
the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring
that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a
war do not return to battle against the United States.177
In Hamdi, the Court found that the appropriate balance between
these competing interests means that "a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice
of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut
the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.
178
Although the plurality found that Hamdi was entitled to the rudiments
of due process, the plurality nonetheless concluded that national-
security interests dictate considerable departures from ordinary due-
process requirements. 179 The plurality thus agreed that fact-finding
proceedings could be "tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to
burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict," and
177. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 531 (2004) (internal quotations
omitted). Hamdi exemplifies the tendency since September 11 to debate all government
policies-not only detention policies but issues as far afield as immigration and the
availability of driver licenses-as conflicts between national security and civil rights.
See Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, "Aliens" in Our Midst Post-9/11:
Legislating Outsiderness within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 1683, 1718
(2005) ("Whatever national security gains the government claims to gain from the
driver's license reforms, these must be balanced against the civil rights of citizens and
noncitizens, including privacy."); David D. Cole, Citizenship in a Post-9/ll World.: An
Exchange Between Peter H. Schuck and David D. Cole: Against Citizenship as a
Predicate for Basic Rights, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2531, 2541, 2547 (2007) ("Due
process analysis in this setting essentially consists of weighing the government's
interests in national security against the individual's interest in a deprivation of
liberty."); Amos N. Guiora, Transnational Comparative Analysis of Balancing
Competing Interests in Counter-Terrorism, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 363, 363
(2006) ("Finding a balance between national security and the rights of individuals is the
most significant issue liberal democratic nations face in developing their counter-
terrorism strategies."); Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights for Security? The Choice
Between Smart, Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2151, 2151 (2006) ("Most debates about terrorism proceed on the
assumption that there is a trade-off between security and rights. The question is often
defined in terms of the proper balance between these two important values.").
178. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
179. Id. at 531.
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hearsay "may need to be accepted as the most reliable available
evidence from the Government in such a proceeding." 8 ° Moreover, the
plurality concluded that the "Constitution would not be offended by a
presumption in favor of the government's evidence."' 8 ' The Court
further suggested "the possibility that the standards we have articulated
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted
military tribunal" rather than an Article III court. 1
82
While Hamdi condones substantial limitations on the ordinary
procedural protections offered in judicial processes, it may nonetheless
represent the strongest procedural protections that enemy combatants
could hope to obtain. Judicial balancing under Mathews v. Eldridge
creates a sliding scale of procedural protections under which detainees
get rigorous review if federal law strongly protects their liberty
interests and little or no review if they have weaker liberties. This
determination depends on the detainee's citizenship, place of seizure,
and place of detention. 183 Hamdi was a U.S. citizen detained on U.S.
soil. Greater procedural rights would be accorded only to U.S. citizens
seized and detained on U.S. soil, such as Jose Padilla, who was given a
full criminal trial.184 The Guantanamo detainees, in contrast, are
foreigners detained outside the technical sovereignty of the United
States. 85 As such, they may be entitled to fewer procedural protections
than were given to Hamdi or Padilla, or even none.' 86
180. ld. at 533-34.
181. Id. at 534.
182. ld. at 538.
183. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 2090. Fallon and Meltzer declare
that there is a "large range of potentially pertinent variables" for determining the scope
of detainees' rights to procedural protections, which include:
whether a detainee is a citizen or an alien; whether an alien detained and
held abroad has significant contacts with the United States that might justify
recognition of constitutional rights; where the seizure was effected-in the
United States or abroad, and on or off a battlefield; where a petitioner is
currently detained-in the United States, in another nation, or at
Guantanamo Bay; and whether the claimed rights find support in historical
practice, precedent, or the due process balancing framework of Mathews v.
Eldridge.
Id.
184. See Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084, 1084-85 (2006) (granting
government's motion "to transfer Padilla from military custody to the custody of the
warden of a federal detention center in Florida, to face criminal charges").
185. See John Yoo, National Security and the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1144, 1160 (2006) ("aliens outside the territorial United States" should
receive fewer procedural protections than citizens because their "individual liberty
interest[s] might be reduced").
186. This is precisely what Professors Fallon and Meltzer appear to suggest
should happen. They argue that the Guantanamo detainees are entitled only to
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The Mathews-Hamdi balancing may also provide little relief for
the Guantanamo detainees because of the absence of a reliable scale
upon which to measure and balance the detainees' liberty interests
against the government's national-security interests. 87 The ease with
which the Mathews test could be manipulated to deny the detainees
judicial review can be seen in the application of its third factor, the
likelihood of erroneous decisions under existing and more rigorous
procedures. A court may conclude that strong procedural protections
could result in erroneous decisions to release terrorists bent on our
national destruction, as the government suggests has already
occurred.'88 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit concluded that criminal
prosecution of accused enemy combatants posed too grave a risk that
terrorists could return to battle. 89 While criminal law establishes
rigorous procedural safeguards out of concern for the consequences of a
fundamental procedural protections because they are foreigners held outside the United
States at a location under exclusive U.S control. Under this scheme, detainees held by
the United States in more remote locations would be entitled to no procedural
protections. See Fallon & Meltger, supra note 11, at 2073. It bears noting that
Guantanamo was selected to house accused enemy combatants precisely because it was
believed that foreigners detained abroad would be entitled to few or no individual
rights. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., and
John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to William J. Haynes II,
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense on Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); JOHN YOO, WAR By OTHER
MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 142-43 (2006) (explaining
that while "[n]o location was perfect," Guantanamo seemed "to fit the bill" because it
would allow military interrogations without judicial review); Scott Higham et al.,
Guantanamo: A Holding Cell in War on Terror, WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at Al.
187. On this issue, the author is in agreement with John Yoo, who argued that
"Eldridge seems particularly inappropriate because of its lack of coherence or
predictability. How are courts to measure values such as 'the private interest' or 'the
government interest' in any systematic manner?" Yoo, supra note 186, at 1159; see
also Michael C. Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 10, 14 (2007) ("[Ilt is possible that the Court would uphold procedures for
classifying aliens as unlawful enemy combatants even though those procedures would
be impermissible under Hamdi for citizens.").
188. See Press Release, Ex-Guantanamo Detainees who have Returned to the
Fight, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20070712formergtmo.pdf (last
visited Nov. 18, 2007) ("[Alt least 30 former GTMO detainees have taken part in anti-
coalition militant activities after leaving U.S. detention"). But see H. Candace Gorman,
Return to the Battlefield: The Number One Guantanamo Myth, HUFFINGTON POST,
Mar. 13, 2007, available at http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/h-candace-gorman-/
return-to-the-battlefield_b 43344.html (arguing that the government's claims are false).
189. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 394-95 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[Tihe
availability of criminal process cannot be determinative of the power to detain, if for no
other reason than that criminal prosecution may well not achieve the very purpose for
which detention is authorized in the first place-the prevention of return to the field of
battle.").
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false positive, an innocent individual sent to jail, the government
defends terrorist-detention policies based on the consequences of a false
negative-terrorist plotters who were not caught in time. In this
context, Vice President Dick Cheney has declared that the government
should respond to a one percent chance of a major terrorist attack as if
it were a certainty.19 ° Given the scale of the terrorist events of
September 11, the potential costs of mistakenly ordering a detainee's
release might be catastrophic. Indeed, the government has presented the
risks to national security that would result from judicial involvement in
detention decisions in truly apocalyptic terms.' 9 ' Out of fear of
releasing potential terrorists, courts applying Mathews might approve
diminished procedural protections for accused enemy combatants. 192
Once the Guantanamo-detainee cases are analyzed as individual-
rights claims, where modem habeas jurisprudence channels them, the
cases call on courts to balance the detainees' rights, which may be seen
as carrying little or no weight, against the necessity of military
detentions, a test courts seem ill-equipped to undertake. 93 As
190. See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE 61-62 (2006) ("We have
to deal with this new type of threat in a way we haven't yet defined .... With a low-
probability, high-impact event like this... I'm frankly not sure how we engage.... If
there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or
develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response."
(quoting Vice President Richard Cheney)); cf Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent
American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 503
(2007).
191. For instance, the government argued in its motion to dismiss the
Guantanamo cases that "[i]nvolvement of the judiciary in second-guessing the
determinations of the Military regarding combatant status would ... strike at the heart
of the Military's ability to conduct war successfully and implicate the safety of the
Nation's troops and, ultimately, its citizens, as well as the safety and support of allied
and coalition forces and countries." Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in
Support at 45, Hicks v. Bush, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 4, 2004).
192. That concern played a role in persuading Congress to remove the courts'
habeas jurisdiction over claims brought by Guantanamo detainees. See 151 CONG. REC.
S12,754 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (asserting that at least a
dozen released detainees "have gone back to fighting").
193. Many judges have expressed great skepticism of the courts' ability to
balance the competing factors, as have many commentators. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749, 2822 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that judicial review of
Hamdan's habeas claim "brings the Judicial Branch into direct conflict with the
Executive in an area where the Executive's competence is maximal and ours is virtually
nonexistent"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 583 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("First, with respect to certain decisions relating to national security and foreign affairs,
the courts simply lack the relevant information and expertise to second-guess
determinations made by the President based on information properly withheld."); Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the judgments required to address the detainees' habeas
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
individual-rights claims, the cases pose considerable difficulties for the
courts, and it is perhaps not surprising that the cases have long been
stalled. As discussed below, the cases present more straightforward
judicial questions if they are understood as challenges to the President's
detention authority rather than as allegations of individual-rights
violations.
B. The Guantanamo Detainees' Claims Are Best Analyzed as
Claims of Unauthorized Detention
While individual-rights analysis may provide an appropriate
vehicle for challenging the process by which the detainees were
designated enemy combatants, the traditional habeas inquiry into the
jailer's authority presents the proper framework for analyzing the
detainees' challenge to the substance of their designations as enemy
combatants. The detainees' central claim that they are not enemy
combatants has two components: arguments challenging the breadth of
the government's authority to hold enemy combatants and arguments
challenging the factual basis for designating the detainees to be enemy
combatants. Together, these arguments amount to a claim of
unauthorized detention-that the government lacks authority to hold the
detainees because, as a matter of fact and law, they are not enemy
combatants.
As this Section argues, traditional habeas principles establish that
the courts should independently review the scope of the government's
legal authority to hold enemy combatants and should determine whether
the government has a sufficient factual basis to justify each detention.
Because the government has asserted broad authority to hold detainees
designated enemy combatants who are not alleged to have participated
in combat, the government is unlikely to prevail in traditional habeas
actions.
1. UNDER TRADITIONAL HABEAS PRINCIPLES, THE GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES ARE ENTITLED TO INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
THE LEGAL SCOPE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DETENTION AUTHORITY
The Supreme Court has resolved the basic question of whether the
President has legal authority to hold enemy combatants seized in the
claims "have traditionally been left to the exclusive discretion of the Executive Branch,
and there they should remain."); see also John Yoo, Courts At War, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 573, 574-75 (2006). A lack of judicial competence was also cited in the Senate as
a reason for removing habeas jurisdiction over the Guantanamo detainees' claims. See
151 CONG. REc. S12,756 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) ("My
belief is the military is the best group to run the war, not Federal judges.").
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war in Afghanistan. In Hamd& v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Court
held that Congress gave the President power to detain enemy
combatants when it adopted the Authorization to Use Military Force
(AUMF). 94 The plurality concluded that, although the AUMF does not
mention detention, it is best read to authorize the President to employ
the accepted "incident[s] of war," and detention of enemy combatants
is "so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise
of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the
President to use. "19
5
Although Hamdi effectively answers the question whether the
President has authority to detain enemy combatants, it does not resolve
several important legal questions about the scope of that power,
including the meaning of the key term "enemy combatant."' 96 The
Hamdi plurality held that the AUMF authorizes the President to detain
"enemy combatants," a term it understood to mean individuals who
were "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or
coalition partners ... and who engaged in an armed conflict against the
United States there."' 97 Hamdi thus upheld the President's authority
under the AUMF to detain persons who both "support[ed]" hostile
forces and "engaged" in armed combat against the United States.'98 In
designating the Guantanamo detainees to be enemy combatants,
however, the government applied a much broader definition of enemy
combatants than the Supreme Court approved in Hamdi. The CSRTs
employed a definition of enemy combatants that encompassed:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
194. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §§ 1-2, 115
Stat. 224, 224-25 (2001). That resolution gives the President power to "use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Id. The
President has also asserted that he has authority to hold enemy combatants under his
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, but the Court in Hamdi did not address
that argument. Hamdi, 542 U.S at 517 ("We do not reach the question whether Article
II provides such authority.")
195. 542 U.S. at 518.
196. Id. at 516. In addition, Hamd did not resolve whether the power to detain
enemy combatants extends to terrorist operatives seized anywhere in the world and
whether the power authorizes indefinite detention. Id. at 516, 519-20.
197. Id. at 516 (internal quotations omitted).
198. See id. at 526 (emphasizing the two elements to the meaning of enemy
combatant).
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This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act
or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed
forces. 199
The touchstone for enemy-combatant designation in the CSRTs is
"support" for al Qaeda or the Taliban alone, and the CSRTs declared
detainees to be enemy combatants if they could be said to have
"supported" al Qaeda or the Taliban, without any allegation that the
detainees participated in combat.2tu
Pursuant to the broad definition of enemy combatant, the CSRTs
designated as enemy combatants individuals whose "support" for al
Qaeda or the Taliban was, by the government's own allegations, minor,
inadvertent, or unwilling. In response to questioning by the district
court, the government agreed that the CSRT definition of enemy
combatant would encompass "[a] little old lady in Switzerland who
writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans in
Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance al-Qaeda
activities. "201 The possibility that the government would hold detainees
based on very loose connections to terrorism is far from hypothetical. 2
A comprehensive study of the CSRT records reveals that sixty percent
of the detainees were designated as enemy combatants based on the
allegation that they were "affiliated with" al Qaeda, the Taliban, or
another related group, without any allegation that they engaged in acts
199. Wolfowitz, supra note 28, at 1.
200. See United States v. Khadr, No. CMCR 07-001, slip op. at 16 (Ct. Mil.
Comm. Rev. Sept. 24, 2007) ("A detainee could be classified as an enemy combatant
under the C.S.R.T. definition simply by being a part of the Taliban or al Qaeda,
without ever having engaged in or supported hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners.") (internal quotations omitted).
201. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C.
2005) (internal quotations omitted).
202. For instance, the CSRT for Omar Amin did not identify any evidence that
he undertook any actions to support terrorism. Instead, the CSRT relied upon evidence
that during an interrogation Amin once referred to the Northern Alliance as "the
opposition," a usage that the CSRT panel stated was "persuasive to the Tribunal that
the Detainee was supportive of the Taliban." See Al Odah v. United States, No. 05-
5064, App. at 1379 (D.C. Cir. filed May 25, 2005). In another case, the Legal Advisor
to the CSRTs concluded that a detainee forced against his will to work for al Qaeda or
the Taliban could properly be designated as an enemy combatant because "a detainee's
motive for joining or supporting al Qaida is irrelevant to a determination of their status
as an enemy combatant .... In other words, if the detainee had claimed that he was
forced to join al Qaida, then his motive would be irrelevant to the Tribunal's purpose."
See Memorandum from Legal Advisor to Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal,
on the Legal Sufficiency Review of Combatant Status Review Tribunal for Detainee, at
5 (Oct. 5, 2004), available at http://www.cageprisoners.com/downloads/
martinmubanga.pdf.
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hostile to the United States, let alone that they engaged in combat
operations against the United States. °3
The lawful scope of the government's authority to hold detainees
under the AUMF is a pure question of law typical of many traditional
challenges to executive detention authority. For instance, in Ex parte
Smith, the petitioner was charged with assault under a city ordinance
adopted in the federal territory of Arkansas and argued that Congress
had not authorized the city to adopt the ordinance .2' The habeas
petition turned solely on the scope of the city's authority provided by
federal statute.2 5 The Guantanamo detainees' cases present a similarly
straightforward question of the scope of the power to detain enemy
combatants provided by Congress in the AUMF. Hamdi suggests that
the question should be resolved by considering "longstanding law-of-
war principles. '206 The question, thus, is whether it is an accepted
incident of war that the military can detain persons who "supported"
the enemy in their hearts but did not engage in combat. Leading
scholars on the laws of war agree that the accepted incidents of war do
not include authority to detain everyone who could be said to "support"
al Qaeda or associated groups. Professors Jack Goldsmith and Curtis
Bradley, for instance, argue that the laws of war allow the military to
detain members of armed forces and other "persons who take a 'direct'
part in hostilities. ,207 Professors Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks argue
that the President's power under the AUMF is more limited.08 Under
203. DENBEAUX, supra note 33, at 8, 11.
204. Ex parte Smith, 22 F. Cas. 372, 372-73 (Ark. Terr. Super. 1832) (No.
12,967a).
205. Id. at 373.
206. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004); see also Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2094 (2005) ("Since the international laws of war can inform
the powers that Congress has implicitly granted to the President in the AUMF, they
logically can inform the boundaries of such powers.").
207. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 207, at 2115. Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith argue that the direct-participation standard:
includes more people than those who participate in combat, and fewer
people than every civilian who supports the war effort, which in some
modern wars would include everyone. Although there is uncertainty about
where the line should be drawn between these two extremes, the key point
is that, under the laws of war, enemy organizations will include some
individuals who assist the organization in carrying out attacks, even if they
are not formal members of the organization.
Id. at 2115-16.
208. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization:
International Law, U. S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 2653, 2657-58 (2005).
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either view, the definition of enemy combatant employed in the CSRTs
far exceeds traditional law-of-war principles.
The government has repeatedly argued, however, that it is due the
"utmost deference" for its judgments regarding the scope of its power
to hold enemy combatants.2"9 Under contemporary administrative-law
principles, the government surely is right that courts owe deference to
an administrative agency's reasonable statutory construction when a
statute it administers is ambiguous or silent.210 The AUMF is entirely
silent on the subject of detentions of enemy combatants, and thus a
court would ordinarily defer to the military's reasonable attempts to fill
gaps in its authority.21' In addition, the government has asserted that the
"customary deference that courts afford the Executive in matters of
military affairs is especially warranted" in reviewing enemy-combatant
designations." 2
While deference to administrative constructions of ambiguous
statutes certainly is the rule today, as is deference to the President in
the area of foreign policy, such deference, in Fallon and Meltzer's
view, is "in considerable tension with the historic office of the Great
Writ."2"3 Deference to a jailer's judgments about the scope of his
209. See Brief for the Respondents at 25, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
(2004) (No.03-6696) ("The Executive's Determination That An Individual Is An
Enemy Combatant Is Entitled To The Utmost Deference By A Court.").
210. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984).
211. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339,
2345-46 (2007) ("[T]he power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and
the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.... When
an agency fills such a 'gap' reasonably, and in accordance with other applicable (e.g.,
procedural) requirements, the courts accept the result as legally binding.") (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
212. Brief for the Respondents at 25, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
(2004) (No. 03-6696). In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justices Thomas and Scalia agreed that
federal courts owe considerable deference to executive constructions of law. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2824 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting). As Thomas's
dissenting opinion concluded, "When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization from Congress, his actions are supported by the strongest of
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion . . . rest[s] heavily upon any who might attack it." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Several prominent academic commentators, including Professors Posner and
Sunstein, have agreed that the government is entitled to considerable deference for its
legal judgments underlying the detention of enemy combatants, including the meaning
of the term "enemy combatant." See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing
Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007); but see Derek Jinks & Neal
Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1234
(2007).
213. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 2069.
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detention powers was entirely unknown in traditional habeas cases.214
As one nineteenth-century habeas case declared, "to require the court in
its investigation to be governed by the decision of an executive officer,
acting under instructions from the head of the department at
Washington, would be an anomaly wholly without precedent, if not a
flagrant absurdity."
21 5
Not one of the 124 federal habeas cases decided between 1789 and
1867 suggests that any judicial deference is due to jailers' views on the
scope of their powers. In over twenty of those cases, federal courts
examined whether the military had lawful custody of draftees and
enlistees who claimed statutory exemptions from military service, and
no example can be found in which a court deferred to the military's
construction of its powers.216 Each of these cases presented a
straightforward legal question of government power to hold the
petitioners, and courts uniformly undertook de novo determinations of
the government's detention power.
It would dramatically undercut the core function of habeas-
protecting against unlawful detention-if jailers were entitled to
deference in determining the scope of their authority. Under traditional
habeas principles, the Guantanamo detainees are entitled to an
independent judicial determination of the scope of the government's
authority to hold them. To the extent that traditional habeas claims
remain available under federal law, federal courts cannot defer to the
Executive's views on its power to hold enemy combatants but must
independently review the scope of executive power to detain them.21 7
2. UNDER TRADITIONAL HABEAS PRINCIPLES, THE GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES ARE ENTITLED TO INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF THE FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR DETAINING THEM
In challenging the factual validity of their designations as enemy
combatants, the Guantanamo detainees assert that the government
simply has rounded up the wrong individuals. As one of the detainees'
214. See Neuman, supra note 108, at 980 ("Moreover, reviving eighteenth-
century practice could require courts . . . to refuse deference to executive
interpretations of statutes. "); cf Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative
State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1983) (arguing that nineteenth-century courts
exercised independent judicial interpretation of statutes in cases involving coercive
government).
215. InreJung Ah Lung, 25 F. 141, 143 (D. Cal. 1885).
216. See supra Part III.B.2.
217. Even if principles of deference applied in this context, courts could
nonetheless find that the government's expansive views are unreasonable and therefore
not entitled to deference.
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lawyers argued before the D.C. Circuit, habeas would have been
available during the internment of Japanese Americans during World
War II for a detainee who sought to challenge not only the underlying
legality of the internment policy but whether that policy applied to him:
"[Suppose] a person came in and he said, 'I'm not of Japanese descent.
My name isn't Hara, it's O'Hara and I'm Irish and you've just made a
mistake here.' He would have a right to go in and challenge that. 218
The detainees' factual claims that they are not enemy combatants
challenge the application of the government's detention authority, not
the violation of their rights. There is substantial reason to believe that,
if they received independent judicial review, many of the detainees'
factual challenges would succeed. If the President's power to detain
enemy combatants is limited, as Goldsmith and Bradley argue, to
persons who "direct[ly] participat[ed]" in combat operations, 21 9 the
government cannot establish a factual basis for holding most of the
Guantanamo detainees. One study of the evidence offered by the
government to support the detentions concluded:
A high percentage [of the detainees] .. .were not captured on
any battlefield . . . .Fewer than 20 percent .. .have ever
been Qaeda members. Many scores, and perhaps hundreds, of
the detainees were not even Taliban foot soldiers, let alone
Qaeda terrorists. They were innocent, wrongly seized
noncombatants with no intention of joining the Qaeda
campaign to murder Americans.22°
Military officials have repeatedly acknowledged that many of the
detainees are being held by mistake. The former Guantanamo
commander stated: "Sometimes, we just didn't get the right folks, [yet
n]obody wants to be the one who signs the release papers. , 2 1 It appears
that five years ago, the CIA sent a confidential memorandum to the
White House that concluded that most of the Guantanamo detainees
"didn't belong there. " 22
2
The government has argued, however, that the courts either are
barred entirely from reviewing the factual basis for designating the
detainees to be enemy combatants or the courts must review the
218. Boumediene v. Bush, Oral Argument Tr. at 17 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 2005).
219. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 207, at 2115.
220. Corine Hegland, Who Is at Guantanamo Bay, NAT'L J., Feb. 4, 2006;
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Falsehoods About Guantanamo, NAT'L J., Feb. 4, 2006.
221. Christopher Cooper, Detention Plan: In Guantanamo, Prisoners Languish
in Sea of Red Tape, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2005, at Al.
222. See Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White
House's War on Terror, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, at 44.
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allegations and evidence under an "extraordinarily deferential"
standard."2 The government argues that judicial examination of the
factual basis for designating detainees as enemy combatants would be
inconsistent with traditional habeas standards, which the government
asserts barred petitioners from challenging the custodian's assertions of
facts. 224 The government further argues that judicial review of the facts
purported to support the designation of enemy combatants would violate
separation of powers:
The Executive's determinations with respect to who should be
and who are enemy combatants is a quintessentially military
judgment, representing a core exercise of the Commander in
Chief authority. . . . By contrast, the judiciary lacks
institutional competence, experience, and accountability to
make such military judgments at the core of the war-making
powers.225
Several commentators have agreed that courts have a very limited role
and owe substantial deference to the military's designations of enemy
combatants. Fallon and Meltzer, for instance, have concluded that
courts should uphold enemy-combatant designations as long as "a
rational trier of fact could have found by a preponderance of the
evidence that a petitioner was an enemy combatant."
226
223. See Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to
Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support at 43-51,
Hicks v. Bush, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 4, 2004) ("Any Judicial Review
of the Results of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals Must Be Extraordinarily
Deferential."); Brief for Respondents at 27, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004) (No. 03-6696) (arguing that courts may "not inquire whether the military
authorities have made a wrong decision on disputed facts") (internal quotations
omitted).
224. Supplemental Brief of the Federal Parties Addressing the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 at 51, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-5062 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(arguing that courts cannot examine the facts purported to justify detention of enemy
combatants because habeas courts at common law "engage[d] in highly deferential
sufficiency review" that precluded prisoners from contesting the facts alleged in the
custodian's return).
225. Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Dismiss
or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support at 43-44, Hicks v.
Bush, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 4, 2004). The government thus argues that,
due to the combined weight of habeas traditions and separation-of-powers principles,
the courts' role in reviewing enemy-combatant designations would be "at most, merely
to confirm that a factual basis exists supporting the Military's determination." Id. at 46.
226. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 2108; ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 258 (2007)
(arguing in favor of complete judicial deference to executive designation of enemy
combatants). But see Carl Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens, 85
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Just as there is no basis in habeas traditions to defer to the
government's conclusions about the legal scope of its power to hold
enemy combatants, there is no basis to defer to the government's
assertions of the facts supporting detention. 227  Habeas courts
traditionally have undertaken independent investigation of the facts
offered to support detention imposed without trial. For instance, in
1670, in Bushell's Case, the Court of Common Pleas held that it was
required to review the factual and evidentiary support for imprisoning
petitioners for contempt of court. 228 The court held that the jailer was
required to provide sufficient factual support so that the court could
assess for itself whether the detention was lawful: "[T]he cause of the
imprisonment ought, by the retorn, to appear as specifically and
certainly to the Judges of the retorn, as it did appear to the court or
person authorized to commit. "229 Similarly, in Bollman, the Supreme
Court did not defer to the magistrate's view that there was a sufficient
factual basis for holding the petitioners on charges of treason but
instead held hearings and examined in detail the affidavits and other
evidence presented to justify detentions .23 The Court ruled that "there
is not sufficient evidence" to hold the petitioners only after it "fully
examined and attentively considered" the testimony and affidavits the
government offered to justify the detentions .21 Numerous other cases
confirm that in traditional habeas cases courts routinely examined the
factual underpinnings of executive detentions.232 This is the modern
view as well.233
N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1735 (2007) ("The factfinder must impose on the Government the
burden to show-preferably by clear and convincing evidence, arguably beyond a
reasonable doubt, or at least by a preponderance of the evidence-that it has met the
criteria for designating a citizen an enemy combatant.").
227. See HURD, supra note 16, at 293 ("The following rule, it is believed,
correctly describes the nature of the facts which may be controverted. Where the
commitment is under express legal process, those facts may be put in issue which, on a
question arising only collaterally, are necessary to warrant the imprisonment.").
228. (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 (C.P.).
229. Id. at 1007.
230. ExparteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125, 135 (1807).
231. Id. at 125.
232. For example, in In re Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No.
11,558), Chief Justice Marshall, riding circuit, reviewed the commitment of a civil
debtor by a municipal authority, took new evidence, and reached his own conclusions,
notwithstanding the municipal authority's previous factfinding on the same subject. See
also R v. Dawes, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 486 (K.B.) (declaring that the Court "went
minutely through the affidavits on both sides" in order to determine whether a soldier
had been lawfully impressed); Id. (ordering the petitioner released from military service
after taking "time ... to look into the affidavits" and independently assessing the facts
underlying the detention); In re Sommersett, (1772) 20 Howell's St. Tr. 1 (K.B.)
(holding a factual hearing on the return); R v. Turlington, (1761) 97 Eng. Rep. 741
1216
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It has often mistakenly been stated that, at common law, habeas
petitioners could not challenge the factual assertions made by the
custodian in the return on the writ.3 While challenges to the factual
basis for detention were largely, if not entirely, barred in habeas
challenges to criminal convictions, the limitation did not apply to
executive detentions and other detentions imposed without trial. As
Professor Dallin Oaks declared: "[W]ith respect to imprisonments other
than for criminal matters, however, the exceptions to the rule against
controverting the return were 'governed by a principle sufficiently
comprehensive to include most . . . cases' so that it was 'impossible to
specify those [noncriminal cases] in which it could not [be
controverted]. ,,235 Habeas proceedings challenging criminal convictions
were limited for a simple reason: the prisoner already had received an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to respond to
the evidence against him, and a jury had found that the government
proved its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. Practically by
definition, detention imposed through a criminal conviction was
understood to be lawful because it was imposed after trial by a court of
competent jurisdiction.236 Thus, the first question, and usually the last
question, that courts asked in resolving habeas petitions challenging
criminal convictions was whether the sentencing court had acted within
its jurisdiction.237
(K.B.); King v. Lee, (1676) 83 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B.) (considering "divers affidavits"
from both sides in deciding habeas petition)); Oaks, supra note 120, at 454 n.20 (listing
instances in which individuals could contradict facts in return); Hafetz, supra note 85,
at 2535.
233. See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969) ("Petitioners in
habeas corpus proceedings . . . are entitled to careful consideration and plenary
processing of their claims including full opportunity for the presentation of the relevant
facts.").
234. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 108, at 986 ("One of the maxims of
eighteenth-century habeas corpus practice had been that the petitioner could not
controvert the facts stated in the return .... Like other maxims, this general statement
papered over exceptions, not all of which were remembered by those who repeated the
maxim.").
235. Oaks, supra note 120, at 454 n.20 (quoting HURD, supra note 16, at 270-
71); see generally Hafetz, supra note 85, at 2515-16.
236. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.14 (2001) ("At common law,
while habeas review of a court judgment was limited to the issue of the sentencing
court's jurisdictional competency, an attack on an executive order could raise all issues
relating to the legality of the detention.") (internal quotations omitted). The conclusion
that habeas courts traditionally undertook little review of criminal convictions is
challenged in ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF
LIBERTY 5 (2001) and Liebman, supra note 120, at 2055.
237. HURD, supra note 16, at 153-54, 331-51; Bator, supra note 165, at 471.
To be sure, even in habeas actions challenging criminal judgments, which were limited
to a review of the criminal court's "jurisdiction," flexible notions of jurisdictional
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In contrast to imprisonment imposed after a criminal conviction,
executive detentions like those in Guantanamo carry no such
presumption of legality:
Detention by executive authority, after all, poses the oldest
and perhaps the greatest threat to liberty under law. For, by
hypothesis, there is incarceration with no judicial
determination of anything. Since the deprivation of liberty has
not been subjected to the scrutiny of a court, it lacks that
assurance of legality which has come to be thought of as
integral to government under law.238
The Supreme Court has declared that the protections offered by habeas
are at their "strongest" in challenges to executive detentions precisely
because executive detention does not involve the assurance of legality
associated with judicial processes.239
Since 1789, federal courts have undertaken independent fact-
finding in reviewing executive detentions. 24° This has been especially
review often allowed broad factual and legal inquiries. See R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF
HABEAS CORPUS 70 (2d ed. 1989) ("The courts have really never been prevented by
[this] common law rule from reviewing facts essential to the jurisdiction or authority
underlying the order for detention").
238. See MEADOR, supra note 161, at 38.
239. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 ("At its historical core, the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is
in that context that its protections have been strongest."); Lonchar v. Thomas, 517
U.S. 314, 322 (1996) (stating that the common law writ's "most basic purpose [was]
avoiding serious abuses of power by a government, say a king's imprisonment of an
individual, without referring the matter to a court"); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
385 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that traditionally the writ was used "to
inquire into the cause of commitment not pursuant to judicial process"); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The historic purpose of
the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.");
Hafetz, supra note 85, at 2525 ("Executive detention implicated the core function of the
writ of habeas corpus . . ").
240. See SHARPE, supra note 237, at 70 ("[Clourts have never really been
prevented by the common law rule from reviewing facts essential to the jurisdiction or
authority underlying the order for detention."); Developments in the Law-Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1238 (1970) ("While habeas review of a court
judgment was limited to the issue of the sentencing court's jurisdictional competency,
an attack on an executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of the
detention."). Moreover, even if deference were appropriate in enemy-combatant cases,
deference to the military's judgment that the Guantanamo detainees are enemy
combatants would be inappropriate. Deference to administrative factfinding is limited to
determinations made "in a judicial capacity," resolving "disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties . . . had an adequate opportunity to litigate."
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). The
designation of the Guantanamo detainees as enemy combatants does not fall within
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true in challenges to military detention. For instance, before 1867,
more than twenty habeas petitions were brought on behalf of military
personnel, including deserters and others seeking to resist military
discipline, claiming that they were not properly subject to military
service. 24' Although federal courts would not review whether the
military was correct to impose punishment on military personnel,
federal courts did not shy away from reviewing whether the military
had lawful custody over the petitioners in the first place.242 The federal
courts uniformly rejected the argument that they lacked authority to
interfere with military custody over its personnel. As one case
concluded: "Whether a man is lawfully in military service must always
be a judicial question. It is peculiarly a question for decision under a
habeas corpus." 243 In habeas challenges to the validity of military
enlistments, federal courts reviewed evidence offered to establish the
petitioners' eligibility to enlist, notwithstanding the military's prior
determinations that the petitioners were eligible. 2 ' Federal courts thus
concluded that habeas required independent judicial determination of
the facts necessary to establish whether the military had lawful custody
over habeas petitioners.24s
those limits, considering the absence of any traditional procedural protections in the
CSRTs. See supra Part II.A.
241. See supra note 140.
242. See, e.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 243
(1960) ("[M]ilitary jurisdiction has always been based on the status of the accused,
rather than on the nature of the offense."); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890)
("It cannot be doubted that the civil courts may in any case inquire into the jurisdiction
of a court-martial, and if it appears that the party condemned was not amenable to its
jurisdiction, may discharge him from the sentence.").
243. McCall's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1225, 1231 (E.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 8,699).
244. See United States ex rel. Henderson v. Wright, 28 F. Cas. 796, 797
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 16,777) ("The proofs show that John M. Henderson was
enlisted in the month of August, 1861."); United States ex rel. Turner v. Wright, 28 F.
Cas. 798, 798 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1862) (No. 16,778) ("[T]he proof before the court is
clear that he was but nineteen years of age on the 2d day of October last."); In re
Keeler, 14 F. Cas. 173, 175 (D. Ark. 1843) (No. 7,637) ("The proof of the facts
alleged in this application, before a court or judge of the United States, would certainly
entitle George B. Keeler to be discharged."); United States v. Stewart, 27 F. Cas.
1336, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1839) (No. 16,400) ("The proof of minority wholly failed."); Ex
parte Brown, 4 F. Cas. 325, 326 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 1,972) (reviewing "evidence"
of whether petitioner's father consented to enlistment); cf United States v. Bainbridge,
24 F. Cas. 946, 951-52 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 14,497) (Story, J., on circuit)
(deciding that Congress authorized minorities to enlist in the Navy, but could require
enlistment of minors without parental consent, and declaring that "[i]f it had been
necessary in this case to ascertain, whether there had been any consent of the father, I
should have thought it necessary to have required more explicit affidavits than have
been made.").
245. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 33, 35-36 (D. Mass. 1866) (No.
8,752) (rejecting the argument that the "secretary of war ... must be presumed to have
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The belief that habeas guaranteed independent judicial examination
of the facts and law offered to support military custody was so strong
that the courts held that the only valid way to diminish their role was
through a valid suspension of the writ. In United States v. Anderson, a
case decided during the War of 1812, the circuit court held that
Congress could not validly give the military final authority to determine
the legality of its custody over military personnel because "Congress
could not pass a law vesting the war department with a power which
would in effect suspend the writ of habeas corpus.' 2' During the Civil
War, Congress enacted a law declaring that the oath given by enlistees
at the time of enlistment "shall be conclusive" that the enlistee was of
lawful age, 247 but courts nonetheless held that the factual question of the
enlistee's age could still be examined independently in habeas
proceedings.248 Similarly, when a federal statute declared that the
military's rejection of claimed exemptions from service "shall be
final," 249 federal courts held that habeas continued to guarantee
independent judicial review.250 As the courts concluded, Congress could
not preclude judicial review of the facts and law offered to support
military custody unless it suspended the writ. As Judge John
Cadwalader declared: "[A]n act of congress making such a decision as
to the status of a citizen final, in such a sense as to preclude judicial
cognizance elsewhere of the question, would not be constitutional. ,
251
exclusive authority" to determine the legality of an enlistment, and that "the courts
have no jurisdiction" to hear a habeas petition). It continues to be the rule that federal
courts can review the factual basis asserted to support the military's custody of military
personnel. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 35 (1972) ("When a member of the
armed forces has applied for a discharge as a conscientious objector and has exhausted
all avenues of administrative relief, it is now settled that he may seek habeas corpus
relief in a federal district court on the ground that the denial of his application had no
basis in fact.").
246. 24 F. Cas. 813, 814 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1812) (No. 14,449).
247. See Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 15, § 2, 12 Stat. 339, 339 (1862).
248. See Seavey v. Seymour, 21 F. Cas. 947, 950 (C.C.D. Me. 1871) (No.
12,596); Wright, 28 F. Cas. at 798-99 ("Congress never intended that the oath,
however false, should be binding on the courts . . . . "). But see In re Cline, 5 F. Cas.
1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 2,896) (holding that an enlistee's age given by oath at time
of enlistment could not be reviewed in a habeas proceeding).
249. See Act of March 13, 1863, ch. 75, § 14, 12 Stat. 731, 733-34 (1863).
250. See Antrim's Case, 1 F. Cas. 1062, 1067 (E.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 495).
251. Id at 1067; see also Seavey, 21 F. Cas. at 953 ("Very strong doubts are
entertained whether congress could constitutionally pass a law giving the exclusive
power to the secretary of war to hear and determine such cases as those mentioned in
the petitions before the court."); In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 33, 35-36 (D. Mass.
1866) (No. 8,752) (holding that a military proceeding did not preclude judicial review);
In re Keeler, 14 F. Cas. 173, 174 (D. Ark. 1843) (No. 7,637) ("The military is
subordinate to the civil authority, and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot
be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
1220
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The principle that Congress cannot preclude habeas review of military
custody absent a valid suspension of the writ apparently continues to
hold, as the Court ruled in 1960 that a statute declaring military review
of court-martial convictions "final and conclusive," and "binding upon
all . . . courts . . . of the United States" could not be construed to
preclude judicial review through habeas.252
These cases provide a clear answer to the government's repeated
demands for deference to military judgments about the facts offered to
support the Guantanamo detentions and invocations of separation of
powers concerns. Under section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), federal courts independently
examined the facts and law offered to support military authority over
soldiers, sailors, and marines, and the courts discharged petitioners
who were determined not to fall within military custody. The military's
authority over its own personnel is a central aspect of military power,
no less than authority over enemy combatants, yet federal courts
traditionally did not defer to military judgments. Moreover, if Congress
and the President object to independent judicial review of the facts and
law supporting military custody of the Guantanamo detainees, the
Constitution provides a ready solution through the power to suspend the
writ. In the absence of a valid suspension, however, the courts cannot
voluntarily relinquish their duty in habeas cases of providing
independent review of military detention.253
While the government might argue that the enlistment and draft
cases show only that federal courts undertook independent investigation
of the facts offered to support military custody of citizens, the courts
have long recognized an obligation in habeas proceedings to examine
the factual basis for holding aliens as well. 54 The courts held that the
require it. It is only in that event the writ cannot be issued. There is no other
restriction.") (internal citations omitted).
252. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 349-50 (1969).
253. The Hamdi plurality likewise agreed that habeas requires independent
judicial review not only of the legal authority for imposing detention but of the facts as
well. See 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004) ("Indeed, the position that the courts must
forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the
broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of
powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of
government.").
254. It might also be argued that federal courts in modern habeas cases
routinely defer to military findings of fact made in court martial and other court-like
military proceedings. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) ("The courts
may inquire whether the detention complained of is within the authority of those
detaining the petitioner. If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide
and condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have
made a wrong decision on disputed facts."). These cases do not conflict with the
argument presented here because the Supreme Court has consistently held that federal
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Alien Enemies Act of 1798 gives the President unreviewable discretion
to decide whether to detain or deport enemy aliens, but judicial review
has remained available to determine whether a petitioner is in fact an
enemy alien.255 More broadly, the courts have never deferred to
executive determinations that petitioners are subject to deportation or
exclusion because they are aliens and not citizens but instead have
always provided independent examination of the factual question of a
detainee's citizenship status through habeas proceedings.256
The Guantanamo detainees do not challenge the President's power
to hold enemy combatants; they simply challenge the President's
assertion that, as a matter of fact and law, they are enemy combatants.
Habeas has always provided a judicial forum to review such claims. As
shown in the enlistment, court-martial, alien-enemy, and deportation
cases, the usual principles of deference to the military in military
matters does not preclude federal courts in habeas proceedings from
independently reviewing whether petitioners properly are within a
habeas review is available to determine whether a military tribunal had proper
jurisdiction over the petitioner, a question that depends on the petitioner's status, not
guilt or innocence. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 243
(1960); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890). In the Guantanamo cases, the
question whether the detainees are properly under the jurisdiction of the military
depends on whether they have the status of enemy combatants. See Franklin, supra note
15, at 5 ("A detainee's status as a combatant on the one hand or a civilian on the other
is therefore a jurisdictional fact which must be subjected to searching inquiry by an
Article III court.").
255. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 n. 17 (1948) ("[W]hether the
person restrained is in fact an alien enemy . . .may also be reviewed by the courts.");
see also United States ex rel. Hack v. Clark, 159 F.2d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1947) ("In a
proceeding of this kind but one question is open to the relator, and that is whether he is
an enemy alien."); Citizen's Protective League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir.
1946) ("Unreviewable power in the President to restrain, and to provide for the
removal of, alien enemies in time of war is the essence of the [Enemy Alien] Act....
[yet t]he one question, whether the individual involved is or is not an alien enemy, is
admitted by the Attorney General to be open to judicial determination."); Ex parte
Fronklin, 253 F. 984, 984 (N.D. Miss. 1918) ("[T]he only question for determination
on this hearing is whether he is a citizen of the United States or is a German alien
enemy."); Minotto v. Bradley, 252 F. 600, 602 (N.D. I11. 1918) ("The sole question,
as I see it, is: Is the petitioner an alien enemy, as defined by Congress? If the petitioner
is not an alien enemy, the writ in this case must issue.").
256. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 279, 285 (1922) (holding
that, notwithstanding an executive determination to the contrary, habeas petitioners "are
entitled to a judicial determination of their claims that they are citizens of the United
States"); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908) (same); see also Holiday v.
Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1941) (rejecting deference to factf'mding by a prison
commissioner and declaring that in habeas cases "Congress has seen fit to lodge in the
judge the duty of investigation. One of the essential elements of the determination of the
crucial facts is the weighing and appraising of the testimony. Plainly it was intended
that the prisoner might invoke the exercise of this appraisal by the judge himself."); see
generally Neuman, supra 108, at 961-63.
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category of persons whom the government has the authority to detain.257
Under traditional habeas principles, the Guantanamo detainees are
entitled to searching judicial review of the factual basis for the
government's claim that they are enemy combatants. From the course
of the litigation, it appears that such evidentiary hearings are exactly
what the government fears most. 258 And apparently for good reason: the
evidence against most of the detainees appears to be weak or
nonexistent. Yet evidentiary hearings are precisely what is required
once the claims brought by the Guantanamo detainees are recognized
for what they are-traditional habeas challenges to the government's
detention powers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Guantanamo detainees' habeas cases have been stalled for
almost six years because the courts have been asking the wrong
question: whether the detainees possess any rights. Courts in habeas
actions traditionally have asked a different question: whether the jailer
has power to hold the prisoner. In the Guantanamo cases, the traditional
habeas inquiry would mean that the government must show that the
detentions fall within the scope of executive authority to hold enemy
combatants. The required judicial inquiry involves both a legal
question, the scope of the category "enemy combatant," and a factual
question, whether the detainees fall within that category. There is
substantial reason to doubt that in most of the Guantanamo cases the
government could prevail on either question. The government has
employed a definition of enemy combatant that far exceeds the
military's detention powers under law-of-war principles, and most of
the detainees are not alleged to have participated in combat and
therefore could not validly be designated enemy combatants. If the
government cannot establish its lawful authority to hold the
Guantanamo detainees, habeas relief must be granted even if the
detainees otherwise have no cognizable rights.
257. See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 158.
259. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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